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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 1787, the Office of the President of 
the United States has had to deal with many governmental problems, 
burdening the President with extraordinary decisions. As the coun­
try has grown in population, in geography, and in world influence 
the number of problems and decisions has escalated, placing immense 
pressure upon the decision making process.'*’ Today, decisions made 
by the President of the United States can affect the future of the 
entire world. Consequently, the advice and administrative assis­
tance a president receives when he is making these decisions is 
crucial. (^Furnishing the President with this advice and assistance 
is one of the most influential elements in the Executive Branch of
the Federal Government, the Presidential Advisory System^
/
Consisting of several segments, the Presidential Advisory 
System is a blend of the old and the relatively new. The Presi­
dents Cabinet, composed of the heads of the executive departments, 
has been a source of advice for presidents since its establishment 
by George Washington, and until recently was the only formal
^•George Reedy, Press Secretary and Special Assistant to 
President Lyndon Johnson, contends that "The presidential burden,
a . . ,  does not lie in the workload. It stems from the crushing 
responsibility of political decision, with life and death literally 
hanging in the balance for hundreds of millions of people." George 
E. Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency (New York: The New
American Library, Inc., in association with The World Publishing 
Company, 1970), p. 24.
1
2collective body the President could turn to for advice and assis­
tance. However, despite occupying a prestigious position in the 
Executive Branch, its value as an advisory body has been over­
rated. Conflict of personalities within the Cabinet, the inde­
pendence of the Cabinet members as heads of separate executive 
departments, and often times the attitude of the President towards 
the Cabinet have reduced its collective value. The value of the 
Cabinet as an advisory source has been realized more through the 
work of individual members acting as counselors to the President. 
Many times a single Cabinet member has emerged as the President’s
o
favori te advis er.
A second segment of the Presidential Advisory System con­
sists of those individuals or groups who contribute advice and 
assistance to the President but are not a part of the Executive 
'Branch, or, in some instances, not a part of the Federal Govern­
ment. Some of these outsiders have found their way into the 
circle of the President’s closest advisers, sometimes termed the 
’’Inner Circle.” A president may receive advice
. . .  from members of the Congress; from independent wise 
men, elder statesmen, academic lights; from presidentially 
named high level commissions or special agents; or merely
2
Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury under George 
Washington, was a favorite Presidential adviser, as was Albert 
Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury under Thomas Jefferson. During 
the Civil War, Edwin Stanton, Lincoln’s Secretary of War, was a 
close adviser, and more recently, during the Vietnam War, Lyndon 
Johnson’s closest advisers were Secretary of State Dean Rusk and 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.
3from conversations with friends, visitors, private interest 
. leaders, and others.3
Outsiders have been advisers to the President since the 
early days of the government. A constant correspondent of Jeffer­
son was Pierre Samuel DuPont de Nemours, one of the founders of 
the DuPont Company. Frank Stearns, a prominent Boston business 
man, was a companion and confidant of Calvin Coolidge; and prob­
ably one of the most influential outsiders in the history of the 
Presidency was Woodrow Wilson’s adviser, Colonel Edward M, House.
Precipitated by the expansion of the Executive Branch of 
the Federal Government that took place during his first adminis­
tration, and the inability of the existing structure to supply the 
advice and assistance he needed, Franklin Roosevelt established 
the newest segment of the Presidential Advisory System in 1939, 
the Executive Office of the President. Structurally closest to 
the”President, the Executive Office represents the first institu­
tionalized organization created expressly for the purpose of 
advising and assisting the President of the United States, and has 
become the core of the Presidential Advisory System.
Before 1939, there was no legal provision for a staff of 
Presidential assistants other than the President’s small personal 
administrative staff. Advisers and assistants worked unofficially 
as aides to the President, holding positions in various executive 
agencies, but working for the President. With the rapid expansion
3Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision-Making In The White House, 
The Olive Branch or The Arrows (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1963), p. 72.
4of the Executive Branch there was a realization of the need for 
more full time assistance. Thus, in 1935 Roosevelt set in motion 
the events that led to the establishment of the Executive Office 
of the President and the institutionalization of the Presidential 
Advisory System.
Chart 1-1
The Presidential Advisory System of Today
The President  Outside Advisers
i
The Cabinet The Executive Office
1, Secretary of State
2, Secretary of the Treasury
3, Secretary of Defense 
. 4. Attorney General
5. Secretary of Labor
6. Secretary of Commerce
7. Secretary of the Interior 
8• Secretary of Agriculture 
9, Postmaster General
10. Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare
11. Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development
12. Secretary of Transpor­
tation
1. The White House Office
2. Office of Management and 
Budget
3. Domestic Council
4. National Security Council
5* Energy Policy Office
6. Office of Economic Oppor­
tunity
7. Council on Economic Policy
8. Federal Property Council
9. Council of Economic 
Advisers
10. Office of the Special 
Representative for Trade 
Negotiations
11. Council on International 
Economic Policy
12. Council on Environmental 
Quality
13. Special Action Office for 
Drug Abuse Prevention
14. Office of Telecommunica­
tions Policy
Roosevelt originally included the White House Office, the
Bureau of the Budget, and three agencies which are no longer
4
functioning, in the Executive Office of the President. Later, he 
established the office of Special Counsel to the President as part 
of the Executive Office. When the Council of Economic Advisers 
and the National Security Countil were established as part of the 
Executive Office after his death, Roosevelt's administrative 
innovations acted as models. These agencies, along with the other 
agencies that have been added to the Executive Office since its 
establishment, presently serve the President by performing 
advisory, supervisory, and coordinating f u n c t i o n s " T h e y  advise 
the President, they supervise other units in the Executive Branch, 
and they try to coordinate similar work being done by a number of 
organizations."^
The continuous expansion of its size and influence since 
1939 has subjected the Executive Office of the President, and more 
particularly the White House Office, to a great deal of criticism 
in the last few years. Much of this criticism has been triggered 
by the ^Watergate scandal." For example, historian Daniel J. 
Boorstin believes that the Executive Office of the President has 
gotten too large to control.^ "The Executive Office of the Presi­
dent has expanded beyond all bounds and has tended to supersede
4The three agencies which are no longer functioning in the 
Executive Office are The National Resources Planning Board, The 
Liaison Office for Personnel Management, and The Office of Govern­
ment Reports.
5James W. Davis, Jr., The National Executive Branch, An 
Introduction (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 24.
6Ibid.
6
7
the executive branch of the government .** He believes that, in
the Watergate Affair, (this expansion of the Executive Office made
it possible for people in the White House to use the Presidents
authority without his knowing it, and it also made it possible for
him to say he did not know what was going on.'j Dr * Boorstin
suggests that the Executive Office ought to be closely scutinized,
0
implying that its size ought to be reduced. Possibly, something 
of this nature may be attempted in the future by Congress or by 
the President himself. But, any attempt at the reduction of the 
size and power of the Executive Office must take into consideration 
the need for the President to carry out his administrative duties. 
Otherwise, the President will encounter the same problem of inade­
quate administrative assistance encountered by Roosevelt before 
the Executive Office was established.
Roosevelts establishment of the Executive Office of the 
President is one of the most significant events in the history of 
the Presidency. Because of his great influence on the institution­
alization of the Presidential Advisory System, it is the purpose of 
this paper to examine Rooseveltfs advisory system and the contri­
butions he made to its structure. The paper will focus on the 
Executive Office, why it was needed, and the struggle involved in 
its establishment. Also, individual chapters will be devoted to 
those present day Executive Office agencies whose existence in the
7"Historian Decries Watergate as *Cult of Personality1," 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXXI, No. 27 (1973), 1799.
8Ibid.
Executive Office of the President was influenced by Roosevelt. 
Agencies discussed will be the White House Office and the Bureau 
of the Budget, original occupants of the Executive Office, the 
Council of Economic Advisers and the National Security Council, 
agencies which also owe their existence in part to Roosevelt. 
Each chapter will briefly review the evolution of the agency and 
Rooseveltfs influence on that evolution.
CHAPTER II
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Until the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, when the 
Presidents of the United States needed administrative help and 
advice ^hey relied on a loosely structured extra-legal advisory
system.^ It consisted of the Presidents Cabinet, an effective
J;
source of advice when the members were consulted individually but 
a relatively ineffective source when consulted as a collective 
body, and an informal group of personal advisers that became known 
as the ffInner Circle.” Both had their beginnings during George 
WashingtonS administration and served succeeding Presidents until 
the 1930S  when Roosevelt realized that the President needed some­
thing more stable and reliable.
When the Founding Fathers were deliberating over the com­
position of the Chief Executive at the Constitutional Convention, 
the idea of establishing an advisory council was discussed at great 
length^ Edmund Randolph, in the Virginia Resolutions, called for
a council of revision made up of the Executive and members of the
1
National Judiciary with authority to exercise the veto power. 
Gouverneur Morris proposed a council of state composed of the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, the Secretary of Domestic Affairs,
1James Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention, ed. 
E. H. Scott (Chicago: Albert, Scott and Co., 1893), p. 62.
8
the Secretary of the Marine, and a Secretary of State to act as
2
Secretary to the Council and Public Secretary to the President.
George Mason suggested the following:
• . c a Privy Council, of six members, t.n the President, 
be established; to be chosen for six years by the Senate, 
two out of the Middle, and two out of the Southern 
quarters of the Union; and to go out in rotation, two 
every second year; . . .3
Despite all of the suggestions made, when a complete draft
of the Constitution was drawn up in the Committee on Style the
council idea was dropped. Some of the Founding Fathers felt that
a council might impede the President. "Give him an able Council
and it will thwart him; a weak one and he will shelter himself
4
under their sanction." The final draft of the Constitution only 
mentioned that the President ". . . may require the opinion, in 
writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive depart­
ments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective
5
offices, . . . "  It was, therefore, left for a Presidential 
advisory structure to evolve.
Because George Washington was the first President of the 
United States, it was natural that his actions in office would 
set precedents followed by succeeding Presidents. When he became
2Ibid., pp. 560-561o 
3Ibid., p. 679.
^James Madison, The Writings of James Madison, IV, ed.
Gaillard Hunt (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1903), p. 234.
3U.S., Constitution, Art. 2, sec. 2.
10
President, attempts were made by him to obtain advice from both 
the Supreme Court and the Senate, but these attempts failed.
Efforts at obtaining advice from the Supreme Court were rebuffed, 
with the Court claiming that ’’separation of powers” precluded it 
from supplying the Executive Branch with advice. Separation of 
powers also played a part in Washington’s efforts to secure the 
opinion of the Senate on a pressing matter. The Senate acted 
annoyed and delayed giving Washington an answer, indicating their
fL
displeasure at being consulted by the President.
Washington did have some limited success with the heads of 
the executive departments. By having conferences with them to dis­
cuss important matters, he expanded the Constitutional stipulation 
of asking for the opinions of the executive heads in writing.
During 1792 and 1793, these conferences became more frequent, and 
in the latter years of his Presidency it was a routine matter to
consult with his executive heads, often times having them vote in
7
an attempt to arrive at a collective decision. Thus, in an 
effort to obtain additional opinions on important matters, Wash­
ington established an extra-constitutional governmental body, the 
President1s Cabinet.
  Washington’s efforts at forming the Cabinet and his
attempts at establishing it as the President’s advisory council
^Marcus Cunliffe, American Presidents and the Presidency 
(New York: American Heritage Press, 1972), pp. 46-50.
7Ibid.
11
were never completely successful. The Cabinet has never func­
tioned adequately as a collective advisory body. Individual 
Cabinet members have become close advisers to the President, but 
the Cabinet’s role as an advisory council has been overrated.
Even within Washington’s Cabinet, there was constant turmoil 
caused by personality conflicts and differences of philosophy.
These conflicts impeded chances for the Cabinet to act collectively.
Succeeding Presidents did not have any more success than 
Washington in developing the full advisory potential of the 
Cabinet. John Adams’ Cabinet was a center for conspiracy against 
him. Jefferson ignored his Cabinet when he was considering the 
Louisiana Purchase and Lincoln did the same when he was deliber­
ating over the Emancipation Proclamation. Jackson appointed four 
different Cabinet-s during his Presidency and found he could not 
work satisfactorily with any of them. Woodrow Wilson very seldom 
met with his Cabinet during the First World War and Calvin
9
Coolidge’s Cabinet meetings usually lasted only fifteen minutes.
The capacity of the President’s Cabinet to function as an 
advisory body is hampered by the way it is constituted. Each 
member is the head of an important individual department in the 
Executive Branch of the Government, being named to the Cabinet to
O
For an indication of the problems faced by Washington 
when dealing with his Cabinet see Chapter 31 in James Thomas Flex- 
ner?s George Washington And The New Nation, 1783-1793 (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1969).
^Louis W. Koenig, The Invisible Presidency (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p . 17.
12
act as individuals while operating that department. They have
collective responsibility only when they are called together by
the President.^ ’’Cabinet members tend to pursue their own 
11policies.” As a result, Cabinet members are often more com­
petitive in their dealings with each other and their relationships 
with the President . ’’They are champions of special and competing 
private interests, of groups functionally specialized. They are 
competitors with respect to appropriations, authority, and pres­
tige.”12
The ability of the Cabinet to act as an advisory body is 
further impeded by the factors involved when a President chooses 
his Cabinet members . He is not always free to pick whom he wants 
in that Cabinet. Party, personal loyalty, geography, socio­
economic factors, and specialized talents all figure in the 
choosing of a Cabinet member; and they can influence the future 
interaction of the President and his Cabinet. Richard F. Fenno,
Jr., author of The President’s Cabinet, calls these factors ’’the 
components of availability” and ’’the components of balance.
J. Wann, The President as Chief Administrator, A Study 
of Franklin D . Roosevelt (Vvhshington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 
1968), p. 46.
11Lester G. Seligman, ’’Presidential Leadership: The Inner 
Circle and Institutionalization,” The Journal of Politics, XVIII 
(August 1956), 412.
■®-2paui H. Appleby, ’’Organizing Around the Head of a Large 
Federal Department,” Public Administration Review, VI (Summer 1946), 
207.
^■^Richard F. Fenno, The President * s Cabinet (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 68-80, passim.
13
To avoid partisan conflicts, the entire Cabinet is, with 
few exceptions, from the same political party as the President; 
and Cabinet positions have often been political rewards for ser­
vice to the party. For years it was a tradition that the chair­
man of the party’s national committee during the President’s 
successful campaign be named Postmaster General in the new 
Cabinet, a post in which a person could easily fulfill Cabinet 
duties and at the same time handle the responsibilities of chair­
man of the national committee,,^
Jj.
Closely related to party loyalty as a factor involved in
choosing a Cabinet member is personal loyalty, the criteria for
which is set by each President, Woodrow Wilson’s conception of
personal loyalty was the readiness a person displayed to follow
his lead without question. A criteria for an appointment to
15
Franklin Roosevelt’s Cabinet was preconvention support.
Geography also plays an important part in the selection of 
Cabinet members. Because a preponderance of the activities of the 
Department of Interior is concerned with the Western states, the 
Secretary of the Interior frequently comes from the West, and a 
farm state usually provides the Cabinet with the Secretary of 
Agriculture. In an effort to give representation to each geo­
graphical section of the country, the President generally makes an 
effort to balance his Cabinet with appointees from all parts of the 
nation. Usually, important political states like New York, Ohio ,
14Ibid., pp. 68-70.
•^Ibid., p. 71.
14
Illinois, and California are represented, as is the Presidents 
home state."^
Allied with the geographical factors involved in naming 
Cabinet members are the socio-economic factors. The Secretary of 
Agriculture chosen from a farm state not only represents a geo­
graphical region, but also represents a socio-economic group, the 
farmer. The same is true of the Secretary of Labor, who is nor­
mally from an industrial state and represents labor. The Secretary
of Commerce, who gives the businessman a representative, often
17
comes from a commercially oriented state.
Administrative ability, political experience, and special
knowledge are also factors considered when Cabinet members are 
18
selected. However, as it is with all the factors involved in 
chopsing Cabinet members, these qualities do not mean that the 
individual Cabinet member will function with the Cabinet as a 
whole, or be able to communicate well with the President who 
appointed him.
Presidents, therefore, came to rely on individual Cabinet 
members rather than the Cabinet as a whole. These individual mem­
bers became part of an informal group of personal advisers that 
also had its beginning in the Washington Presidency. Washington 
included Congressman James Madison, Secretary of State Thomas 
Jefferson, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, and in
16Ibid., pp. 71-79.
^^Ibid.
18Ibid«, pp. 75, 80.
15
the early years Chief Justice John Jay in his informal circle of 
advisers.
Following Washington’s lead, succeeding Presidents, 
partly because of their dissatisfaction with the Cabinet as a 
group, sought advice on matters important and confidential from 
those to whom they felt closest. This group of the Presidents 
closest advisers became known as the "Inner Circle,11 with some of 
the closer knit circles being immortalized by the press. Jackson’s 
and lyier’s were referred to as the ’’Kitchen Cabinet,” Cleveland’s 
was the ’’Fishing Cabinet,” and Teddy Roosevelt’s circle of advisers 
was known as the "Tennis Cabinet.” This group’s composition 
varied, depending upon who enjoyed the chief executive’s confi­
dence. The advisers came from the Cabinet, the President’s per­
sonal staff, officials of the various executive agencies, members 
of Congress, party leaders, personal friends, and leaders of major 
interest groups such as labor and agriculture.
When Franklin Roosevelt became President in 1933, it was 
the loose structure of the Cabinet and his circle of personal 
advisers that he had to rely on for administrative assistance and 
advice in solving the problems of the Depression. However, in 
addition to the factors faced by previous Presidents when dealing 
with the Cabinet, Roosevelt had certain personal traits which 
hindered his working relationship with the Cabinet as a collective 
body. Roosevelt preferred dealing with people individually on a 
face to face basis, and he was reluctant to delegate authority.
19Koenig, pp. 39-43.
16
Most of the important matters were discussed with the Cabinet mem­
ber outside of the Cabinet meeting in their separate capacities as 
heads of their departments, not as the collective Cabinet0 In the 
beginning he held regular Friday meetings of the Cabinet and 
encouraged very searching inquiries and lengthy discussions with 
all the Cabinet members participating. After a while, the pro­
cedure lapsed into a direct communication between a particular
cabinet officer and the President concerning the Cabinet member's 
20special field. Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's Secretary of the 
Interior, described the relationship that existed between the 
President and his Cabinet .
The cold fact is that on important matters we are 
seldom called upon for advice. We never discuss 
exhaustively any policy of government or question of 
political strategy. The President makes all of his own 
decisions and, so far at least as the Cabinet is con­
cerned, without taking counsel with a group of advisers.
On particular questions he will call into his office 
persons directly interested, but it is fair to say that 
the Cabinet is not a general council upon whose advice 
the President relies or the opinions of which, on 
important matters, he calls for.21
Also, it was not uncommon for Roosevelt to bypass Cabinet 
heads on a particular issues. Sometimes he would use unofficial 
advisers to carry out tasks that were traditionally performed by 
Cabinet members. Harry Hopkins, for example, served Roosevelt 
informally as a . . buffer, communication line, sounding board,
2^Wann, pp. 47-48.
21Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. I ekes, 
Vol. I: The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936 (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1953), p. 308.
17
22coordinator, listening post, and mouthpiece abroad.” In domestic 
affairs Ickes and Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, both com­
plained of not being consulted on various issues. In the area of 
foreign affairs Roosevelt believed it was necessary to be his own 
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.
Roosevelt generally shied away from inter-departmental 
mechanisms such as standing committees and secretaries. With the 
aversion he had towards inter-departmental mechanisms and his dis­
inclination to work with the Cabinet, it was ironic that Roosevelt
was the President who created the first Cabinet secretariat, the
24National Emergency Council.
In an effort to help coordinate the many agencies estab­
lished to fight the depression, he formed, by executive order, the 
Executive Council in July of 1933 ". . .to provide for the orderly
presentation of business and to coordinate inter-agency problems of
25organization and work of the new governmental agencies, . . .” 
Nothing more than the Cabinet expanded to include the heads of the 
newly formed economic emergency organizations, the Executive Coun­
cil met with the President every Tuesday. Roosevelt told Louis 
Brownlow that "these meetings, . . • , were exceedingly useful in
22Fenno, p . 46.
23Ibid., pp. 45-46.
2^Richard E. Neustadt, "Approaches to Staffing The Presi­
dency," The American Political Science Review, LVII (December 1963), 
856.
25Samuel I . Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses 
Franklin D . Roosevelt, II (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 281.
18
keeping him informed of what was going on, especially in the
,,26emergency agencies."
The Executive Council proved to be too large and cumber­
some. As a result, on November 17, 1933, by executive order, 
Roosevelt established the National Emergency Council (NEC).
The purpose of the National Emergency Council was to be a working
O O
secretariat for the Executive Council. It was to coordinate the 
New Deal agencies and ". . .to act in a capacity advisory to the
O Q
President. . • The NEC was to handle the functions pertaining
to the emergency activities instituted to help combat the depres­
sion, and the Executive Council was to handle those matters not 
connected with the emergency program.
The National Emergency Council and the Executive Council 
met with the President on alternate weeks at first, and then began 
having joint meetings with him. Distinction between the two bodies 
became increasingly difficult, so in October, 1934, Roosevelt
2^Louis Brownlow, A Passion For Anonymity (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 319.
2^The National Emergency Council was composed of the Sec­
retary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of 
Labor, the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator of Agri­
cultural Adj'ustment, the Administrator of Federal Emergency Relief, 
the Administrator for Industrial Recovery, the Chairman of the Home 
Owners Loan Corporation, the Governor of the Farm Credit Adminis­
tration, and a representative of the Consumers1 Council. The 
Attorney General, the Director of the Budget, and the Chairman of 
the Federal Trade Commission were added a month later.
28Brownlow, p. 320.
2^Rosenman, Roosevelt's Public Papers, II, p. 488.
19
consolidated the two under the name of the National Emergency
-1 30 Council.
As a coordinating body the National Emergency Council
proved to be a disappointment. For one thing, the Council was
too large to be effective. Quoting RoOsevelt:
. . .  like a New England Town meeting, it was too big 
to do much actual work. It had to be split up into
committees until in the end I couldn't take it any more
because I found myself making stump speeches to the 
council instead of listening to its members.3
Secondly, Roosevelt's desire to be the final decision maker
crippled the coordinating capacity of the Council. He really
never gave it authority to act for him, and he never fully
supported the Executive Director. The Executive Director was
never given any real power, and final decisions had to be made by
Roosevelt himself, thereby, causing confusion within the Council.
Instead of using the Council as an effective integrating device in
32itself, he simply used it as a means to help him coordinate. He
used the Council like he used the Cabinet, as a sounding board,
getting ideas from members and using them to perfect his own ideas.
"He delegated authority and controlled his subordinates in such a
way that the power to make final . . .  decisions almost always
33remained in his own tight grip." Although the National Emergency
^^Brownlow, p. 321.
3lIbid.
32Wann, p . 71.
33Ibid.
20
Council was a disappointment as a coordinative body, it did offex
the President a source of advice and information concerning the
progress of the emergency relief programs.
In the thirties, the nature of the times and the decisions
that had to be made forced Franklin Roosevelt to call upon what
34James MacGregor Burns terms a "stable of advisers." His infor­
mal group of advisers consisted of people from all facets of 
national government plus some outside of the government. It 
became a large and ever changing group with people constantly
i
moving into and out of it.
From the Cabinet, James Farley was one of Roosevelt1s 
chief advisers on political matters until the two had a falling 
out when Roosevelt ran for a third term in 1940. Also enjoying a 
closer relationship with Roosevelt than did most of the other 
Cabinet members were Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the 
Treasury, and Henry Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture and later 
Vice President of the United States•
Roosevelt’s circle of advisers also included Congressional 
leaders: Senator Key Pittman of Nevada became a member of Roose­
velt’s pre-1932 election policy advisers, and James F. Byrnes, 
Senator from South Carolina served Roosevelt in several capacities 
until Roosevelt’s death. In the House of Representatives, a fre­
quent conferee of Roosevelt’s was Sam Rayburn, Congressman from
35Texas who became Speaker of the House in 1940.
^James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 154.
35see Booth Mooney’s Roosevelt and Rayburn, A Political 
Partnership (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Go., 1971).
21
Outside of government, Roosevelt consulted with old 
politicos like Colonel House, Woodrow Wilson’s former assistant, 
and labor leaders like William Green of the American Federation 
of Labor Edward J. Flynn, political boss of the Bronx in New
York, was a close political adviser while Roosevelt was Governor 
of New York and while he was President0 When James Farley 
resigned as Chairman of the National Democratic Party, he was 
succeeded by Flynn,
A perennial adviser to presidents from Woodrow Wilson to
Dwight Eisenhower was financier Bernard M, Baruch, Although he
opposed Roosevelt’s nomination in 1932, he frequently contributed
advice and assistance after Roosevelt became President, Baruch’s
• • . proteges manned many of the subsequent key New 
Deal posts; Hugh Johnson came in as administrator of NRA, 
George N. Peek as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture and 
Herbert Swope, as an all-around assistant.
Felix Frankfurter, Harvard law professor and a Roosevelt
Supreme Court appointee, was a long time good friend and constant
adviser of Roosevelt’s even after Frankfurter became A Supreme 
38Court Justice. As was the case with Bernard Baruch, Frank­
furter’s proteges became prominent members of Roosevelt’s admin­
istration.
^Bur n s , p . 154 .
^Koenig, p, 39,
88The extent of their friendship can be seen in Roosevelt 
and Frankfurter, Their Correspondence 1928-1945, annotated by Max 
Freedman. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967.
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Also included in Roosevelt’s circle of advisers were aides 
who worked unofficially for the President. Holding positions in 
various executive agencies, these unofficial aides served as 
policy advisers and administrative assistants, This group was 
extra-legal in nature and included some of Roosevelt’s closest 
adviserso Roosevelt used these aides informally to handle a lot 
of.behind-the-scenes tasks. In filling a gap that existed on the
39
White House staff, their help was informal and somewhat irregular.
During most of his first two terms in office, it was the 
loose advisory structure consisting of the Cabinet and the infor­
mal group of advisers, supplemented by the National Emergency 
Council and his personal staff, that Roosevelt primarily depended 
upon for advice and assistance. The consolidating and institution­
alizing of this loose structure was one of Roosevelt’s Objectives 
when he began efforts towards the end of his first term to reorgan­
ize the Executive. The product of his efforts was the Executive
40
Office of the President.
One of Roosevelt’s goals when he took office in 1933 was 
the improvement of governmental administration by reorganization of 
the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. However, his efforts 
to do this were curtailed for much of the first term because pre­
occupation with efforts to counteract the effects of the depression 
precluded any moves toward reorganization. By 1935, the growth of
39Wann, p. 40.
40Ibid.
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the Executive Branch and the confusion caused by the creation of 
numerous depression fighting government agencies made it impera­
tive that a major reorganization effort be launched0 His attempts 
at reorganizing and coordinating, as exemplified in the establish­
ment of the Executive Council and the National Emergency Council,
41
were minimally successful.
Roosevelt recognized that:
an otherwise professional performance during his 
first term in the Presidency was being severely hampered 
by the sheer multiplicity and complexity of his duties 
and by the want of effective assistance in their dis­
charge ,42
In the summer of 1935, Roosevelt began discussing the
problem of improved management in the Executive Branch with the
members of the Advisory Committee to the National Resources 
43SBoaxd. During the course of one of these discussions, Roosevelt 
asked Professor Charles E. Merriam, one of the Committee’s members, 
to submit a memorandum on the subject. Merriam, with the collab­
oration of Louis Brownlow, Director of the Public Administration 
Cleaxing House in Chicago, drew up the memorandum and presented it
41Ibid., p. 22.
Clinton L. Rossiter, "The Constitutional Significance of 
the Executive Office of the President,” The American Political 
Science Review, XLIII (December 1949), 1207.
4^The National Resources Board was composed of Secretary 
of the Interior Ickes, Secretary of War Dern, Secretary of Agri­
culture Wallace, Secretary of Commerce Roper, Secretary of Labor 
Perkins, Federal Emergency Relief Administrator Hopkins, and the 
three members of the Advisory Committee, Frederic A. Delano, Wesley 
C. Mitchell, and Charles E. Merriam. The members of the Advisory 
Committee had been brought into the government as the National 
Planning Board to assist Ickes in planning the activities of the 
public works projgram. Wann, pp. 204-205.
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to the President. In their memorandum they stated that a study
could be made.
It would be possible to make a thorough study of the 
whole problem as it develops in American public life--a 
study directed toward the institutional arrangements, 
general understandings and practices which would most 
effectively aid the Executive in the double task of man­
agement plus political leadership and direction.44
They also suggested that the Public Administration Committee of
the Social Science Research Council, a private research group
45headed by Brownlow, would be willing to undertake the study.
Discussions of the problem continued through the winter of 
1935-36, and, in late February, Roosevelt asked Brownlow to pre­
pare a more precise statement of what a study of reorganization in
46the Executive would include. After a series of meetings between 
Brownlow and the President, it was announced on March 22, 1936, 
that a committee had been appointed ”. . .to make a study of the 
relation of the Emergency Agencies to the regular organizations 
of the Executive branch of the Government.”4^ Named to the Com­
mittee were Brownlow, Merriam, and Luther Gulick, Director of the 
Institute of Public Administration in New York.
Roosevelt, in naming his own committee, decided against 
having the Public Administration Committee of the Social Science
44Brownlow, p . 327.
45Ibid., pp. 327-328.
46Ibid., p. 334.
4^Samuel I . Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, V (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 144.
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Research Council do the study for two reasons. First, the acti­
vities of the Public Administration Committee were supported by 
funds from the Rockefeller Foundation, and Roosevelt felt that 
connecting the name of Rockefeller with such a study would be 
frowned upon by members of Congress. Secondly, he felt that the 
magnitude of the subject matter dictated that the committee be
48appointed by him and that it have official governmental status •
At the same time that he appointed his committee, Roose­
velt sent a letter to the Senate asking that Virginia Senator 
Harry F. Byrd's Committee, already established to consider re­
organization, cooperate with the Presidents Committee. Also, he 
sent a letter to the House of Representatives asking the House to
establish a similar committee to work in cooperation with the
49Presidents Committee.
Because 1936 was an election year, the members of the 
Committee and the President agreed that it might be politically 
expedient if the Committee did not meet with the President until 
after the election on November. Roosevelt did not want to risk 
having pre-election political opposition build against him over 
the subject of reorganization. This was the first effort by 
Roosevelt to keep the activities of the Committee secret. Despite 
his letters to Congress asking for cooperation, the activities of 
the Committee and the contents of its report were kept secret up 
until the report was announced. Roosevelt wanted to keep everything
48Wann, pp. 75-76.
^^Rosenman, Roosevelts Public Papers, V, p. 144.
secret so that when the report was submitted he could not feel 
bound to accept it if he disagreed with its contents .5<^
The Committee was free to work on its own until after the 
election, not meeting with Roosevelt until November 14, when they 
discussed tentative recommendations. It was at this meeting that 
Roosevelt, offering a bit of criticism, outlined his desire for a 
group of administrative assistants in the White House to aid him 
in managing and coordinating the work of the departments and 
agencies. He also criticized the lack of a plan to incorporate 
the independent regulatory commissions into the regular executive
organization. Except for these two criticisms he endorsed what
. 51the Committee had produced so far.
On Sunday, January 3, 1937, the final report was presented
to the President and approved• On January 10, it was presented to
the Democratic leaders of Congress; the next day Roosevelt
answered questions concerning the report at a news conference; and
on January 12, he sent the report to Congress, asking for the
52adoption of its major recommendations.
The proposals of the Committee may be summarized as 
follows:
1. Expand the White House staff so that the President 
may have a sufficient group of able assistants in his own 
office to keep him in closer and easier touch with the 
widespread affairs of administration and to make a speedier 
clearance of the knowledge needed for executive decision;
50Richaxd Polenberg, Reorganizing Roosevelt *s Government, 
The Controversy Over Executive Reorganization (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), p . 14.
5^Ibid., pp. 20-21.
5^Wann, p p a 84-85.
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2. Strengthen and develop the managerial agencies of 
the Government particularly those dealing with the Budget, 
efficiency research, personnel, and planning, as management 
arms of the Chief Executive;
3. Extend the merit system upward, outward, and down­
ward to cover all nonpolicy-determining posts; reorganize 
the civil-service system as a part of management under a 
single responsible Administrator, strengthening the Civil 
Service Commission as a citizen Civil Service Board to 
serve as the watchdog of the merit system; and increase the 
salaries of key posts throughout the service so that the 
Government may attract and hold in a career service men and 
women of the highest ability and character;
4. Overhaul the 100 independent agencies, administra­
tions, authorities, boards, and commissions, and place them 
by Executive order within one or the other of the following 
12 major executive departments: State, Treasury, War,
Justice, Post Office, Navy, Conservation, Agriculture, 
Commerce, Labor, Social Welfare, and Public Works; and 
place upon the Executive continuing responsibility for the 
maintenance of effective organization;
5. Establish accountability of the Executive to the 
Congress by providing a genuine independent postaudit of 
all fiscal transactions by an Auditor General, and restore 
to the Executive complete responsibility for accounts and 
current financial transactions.53
The submission of the Committee's Report to Congress 
marked the beginning of a long and bitter struggle to pass legis­
lation that would enable Roosevelt to implement the suggestions 
made by the Committee. Opposition from Congress was expected and 
it came almost immediately. Senator Byrd, who had pledged the 
cooperation of his Senate committee with the President's Com­
mittee, supported what the President was doing until the report 
was announced. He had even asked Brownlow to serve as head of his 
advisory committee, and he wanted Gulick's Institute for Public 
Administration to do the research. Byrd promised not to release 
any of the findings of his own committee until after the President
53Report of the President's Committee on Administrative 
Management (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 52.
had presented his plans; Byrd, however, understood he would have 
an opportunity to examine those proposals and offer his own sug­
gestions* When the report was announced, Byrd withdrew his 
54support .
Byrd decided to withdraw his support for the President’s 
plan when he realized he disagreed with Roosevelt’s spending 
policies. Byrd’s approach to reorganization was that of fiscal 
responsibility and he believed the aim should be a balanced 
budget. Roosevelt, on the other hand, viewed a balanced budget 
as highly desirable, but a secondary priority to improved manage­
ment. Byrd had always been suspicious of Roosevelt’s loose fiscal 
policy, and the proposal in the Brownlow Report to abolish the
Comptroller-General and replace the pre-audit of Executive fiscal
55■transactions with a post-audit confirmed his suspicions. Also
contributing to Byrd’s decision to break with the President was
the manner in which he had been treated by the President and the
Committee. The Committee failed to confer with him like they had
promised, and the Report was announced without Byrd’s seeing it.
56When he requested to see the President, he was ignored.
54Polenberg, pp. 31-35.
^ T h e  President’s Plan would "change the existing comp­
troller general into an ’auditor general’ responsible solely to 
the Congress for the post-audit of federal fiscal activities; and 
transfer the existing pre-audit function to the Treasury and the 
quasi-Judicial function to the attorney general." Brownlow, p. 386.
^^Polenberg, pp. 31-35.
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Supporting Senator Byrd's view and other fiscal conserva­
tives in the Congress were the recommendations made by the 
Brookings Institution. Brookings had been hired to do the 
research work on reorganization for the Senate and the House, and 
their recommendations concerning the Comptroller-General ran 
counter to the proposals made by the Brownlow Committee. The key 
difference between the two reports was the view of where control 
of expenditures should be. The Brownlow Report recommended con­
trol by the Executive and Brookings recommended control by Con- 
57 "
gress.
Another source of Congressional opposition arose from 
those Congressmen who were alienated by the secrecy surrounding 
the Brownlow Reportc Not one Congressman was consulted con­
cerning reorganization during the period in which the Committee 
was preparing its report. The contents of the report were not 
known to congressmen until being sprung upon them on January 10. 
Roosevelt further alienated them by giving the impression that he
did not want any modification of the plan, which was interpreted
58by the congressmen as dictatorial.
During 1935 and 1936 there was growing resentment over 
Roosevelt's manner of dealing with Congress. Some believed he had 
become high handed and arrogant. Others resented the loss of 
power that had been experienced by the Congress. The Executive 
reorganization plan and the manner in which it was presented
5^Ibid., p . 39. 
58Ibid., p. 42.
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coupled with Roosevelt's ill conceived plan to reorganize the
59federal courts, submitted February 5, 1937, were enough for a 
Congress, which had become increasingly critical of what it con­
sidered a usurpation of its power, to say no. The Congress linked 
the two plans together and rebelled against what it considered the 
dictatorial actions of the President,, Also, there was an opinion 
in Congress that it was the place of Congress to introduce govern­
ment reorganization legislation; and if they granted the President
the right to issue reorganization orders they would be giving up
,. . 60 that power.
„ . . the leaders of the legislative branch • • . from 
the beginning of the government had considered them­
selves responsible for the control, confinement, 
building, and ultimate determination of the organization 
of all branches of the government
A joint committee was created by Congress to consider
reorganization, holding occasional hearings with the Presidents
Committee during the months of February, March, and April of 1937.
However, most of the time of Congress was taken up by the President1 s
^ T h e  conservative Supreme Court of the New Deal period had 
been declaring much of Rooseveltfs actions to combat the depression 
unconstitutional. Since six members of the Court were over seventy 
years of age, Roosevelt, in an effort to overcome this handicap, 
proposed that for every justice over seventy who refused to resign, 
a co-justice be appointed to the court. If the proposal became 
law, Roosevelt would be able to appoint six new justices, thus, 
enlarging the Court to fifteen members and overcoming the handicap 
the Supreme Court presented. Leonard Baker, Back to Back, The Duel 
Between F.D,R. and the Supreme Court (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1967), pp. 8-9.
^°Wann, pp. 89-90.
^Brownlow, p. 392.
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Court Bill, and little positive action was taken on reorganization. 
When time came in June for a bill to be drafted, there was a dis­
agreement between the Senate leaders and the House leaders as to 
how the drafting should be done. Senator Robinson, Chairman of 
the Joint Committee, wanted a single bill; whereas, Congressman 
John Cochran, leader of the House delegation, wanted to split the
bill into four proposals. Thus, the two groups proceeded to draft
62their own bills. The Senate ran out of time in its session 
before reorganization was brought up, but the House of Representa­
tives was able to vote on two of the four measures into which the 
reorganization plan had been broken down. The House passed both 
measures by a substantial margin, but the opposition to these 
measures on the floor of Congress was a portent of darker days 
ahead for the Roosevelt Administration.
The first measure, providing for six presidential assis­
tants, was attacked by Congressman Charles L. Gifford of Massja- 
chus etts.
They are asking for more secretaries to write our 
legislation for us; brain children who will write our 
bills in such difficult language that even our own Sam 
Rayburn will need have them at his side to advise him.^
Representative Dewey Short of Missouri called the measure an
64
attempt at 11. . . one-man-rule government by executive decree.”
62Polenberg, pp. 46-47.
^U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Representative 
Gifford speaking against H. R. 7730, 75th Cong., 1st sess., July
27, 1937, Congressional Record, 7683.
64u„S. Congress, House of Representatives, Representative 
Short speaking against H. R. 7730, 75th Cong., 1st sess., July 27, 
1937, Congressional Record, 7691.
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He classified the Presidential assistants as "theoretical, intel- 
lectual, professional nincompoops. . . ."
The second measure introduced, regrouping agencies and 
creating a Department of Welfare, was attacked with the same type 
of language. Representative Mott from Oregon claimed that the 
Congress and not the President should change or consolidate gov- 
ernmental agencies• Representative Short attacked this measure 
as vitriolically as he attacked the first.
God pity America i.n the future if we continue to 
refuse responsibility that is ours, and cowardly,
. . . , turn over our constitutional prerogatives and 
surrender not only our rights but also our duties to 
some individual at the other end of Pennsylvania 
Avenue.^7
Reorganization made no further legislative progress during 
the first session of the 75th Congress before adjournment, and was 
not taken up again until the Senate did so during the third ses­
sion of the 75th Congress in March of 1938. In the meantime, 
opposition to reorganization began to build outside of Congress. 
The rise of dictatorships in Europe made much of the public uneasy 
about too much executive power. Also, during this time there was 
a setback in economic recovery and people were afraid RooseveltTs 
programs were not working. They became suspicious of his actions.
65Ibid.
^U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Representative 
Mott speaking against H. R. 8202, 75th Cong., 1st sess., August 13, 
1937, Congressional Record, 8858.
£*7U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Representative 
Short speaking against H. R. 8202, 75th Cong., 1st sess., August 
13, 1937, Congressional Record, 8861.
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These two factors made the Court Plan and the Reorganization Plan 
unpopular• Conservative anti-administration groups like Frank 
Gannett’s National Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government 
tried to mobilize the public against the Reorganization Plan, 
claiming that it would give the President dictatorial power. 
Opposition was generated by the Civil Service advocates against 
the suggestion to reorganize the Civil Service under a single 
administrator. Semi-autonomous government agencies like the Corps 
of Engineers, and pressure groups like the American Legion and the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars lobbied against the proposal to incor­
porate the independent government agencies into the Executive 
departments. Congressmen and Senators were deluged by telegrams
68and letters urging them to vote against any reorganization bill.
When the Reorganization Bill was introduced in the Senate 
it was opposed by conservative Senators who fought the Court Plan, 
claiming dictatorship. Senator Hiram Johnson of California warned 
the Senate;
Someone once said, "Democracy gives every man the 
right to be his own oppressor." Whether that be so or 
not, let us not be parties to oppressing ourselves or 
killing democracy.69
Opposition also came from those Senators against the Civil Service
proposal and those against the proposal transferring government
regulatory agencies into the Executive departments.
^8Polenberg, pp. 148-154.
^^U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Hiram Johnson speaking 
against S. 3331, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., March 17, 1938, Congres­
sional Record, 3465.
34
Despite this strong opposition the administration forces
led by Senator James Byrnes of South Carolina was able to push
\70the Reorganization Bill through the Senate by a 49 to 42 vote.)
However, administration people were not so successful when the
bill was sent to the House of Representatives for approval. ( T^he
House voted 204 to 196 to send the measure back to committee,
71constituting defeat for Roosevelt.
It was a combination of things that defeated the Reorgani­
zation Bill. Those who wanted to inflict a defeat on the Presi­
dent, those who wanted to protect favorite bureaus and agencies,
and primarily those who resented the expanding authority of the
72Executive all joined forces to defeat the bill.
After the defeat of the Reorganization Bill in the House
of Representatives, Roosevelt decided to let things cool off
before trying to push another reorganization bill through Congress.
In 1939 he submitted a watered down version of the earlier reor-
73
ganization bill. Authorizing the President to suggest plans of
reorganization, the bill made the plans subject to a veto by a
majority of both Houses.
The reorganizations specified in the plan shall take 
effect in accordance with the plan:
(a) Upon the expiration of sixty calendar days after 
the date on which the plan is transmitted to the Congress,
7^Polenberg, p. 138. 
7lIbid., pp. 165-166.
72Ibid., p. 175
73Wann, pp. 97-98.
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but only if during such sixty-day period there has not 
been passed by the two Houses a concurrent resolution 
stating in substance that the Congress does not favor 
the reorganization plan.?4
The Bill also dropped the controversial issues of modernizing the
civil service system, renovating accounting procedures, creating
new departments of government, and bringing regulatory agencies
75into the Executive departments. This time the Bill had a rela­
tively easy time of it and was passed by both Houses .y)
In accord with the Reorganization Act, Roosevelt submitted 
five reorganization plans to Congress, Plan I being the most sig­
nificant in the study of the Presidential Advisory System. Sub­
mitted April 25, 1939, and approved by Congress twenty-two days 
later, (plan I asked for the power to establish the Executive 
Office of the President, and on September 8, 1939, Roosevelt
issued Executive Order 8248 establishing the Executive Office.
There shall be within the Executive Office of the 
President the following principal divisions, namely;
(1) The White House Office, (2) The Bureau of the 
Budget, (3) The National Resources Planning Board, (4)
The liason Office for Personnel Management, (5) The 
Office of Government Reports, and (6) in the event of 
a national emergency, or threat of a national emergency, 
such office for emergency management as the President 
shall determine.?^
^Reorganization Act, Statutes at Large, LIII, sec. 5(a), 
562 (1939).
?5Polenberg, p. 185.
76Samuel I . Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, VIII (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1941), p. 491.
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The White House Office, one of two original Executive 
Office agencies still active today, was divided into three sub­
divisions; the Secretaries to the President, the Executive Clerk, 
and the administrative assistants. Todays White House Office 
has grown since its establishment and has been changed somewhat by 
each President, but the basic structure is the same.
^The second division of the Executive Office established by 
Roosevelt's Executive Order was the Bureau of the Budget, also 
still active. It was removed from the Treasury Department and 
placed at the Presidents right hand to be used by him as a part 
of his personal s t a f f .  The Bureau was given numerous adminis­
trative and advisory duties by Rooseveltfs Executive Order
The other divisions of the Executive Office, the National 
Resources Planning Board, the Liaison Office for Personnel Man­
agement, and the Office of Government Reports have all disappeared 
from the Executive Office. The National Resources Planning Board 
was abolished in 1943 when Congress decided to withhold funds from 
the agency; however, its duties of advising the President on 
economic conditions and proposing measures to improve economic 
stabilization were later given to the Council of Economic Advisers 
by Congress. The Liaison Office for Personnel Management func­
tioned until 1953, at which time, President Eisenhower made the 
Liaison Officer a personal adviser on personnel matters and 
eliminated the Liaison Office. The Office of Government Reports, 
established to handle information flowing between the Federal 
Government and state and local governments, was ma^de a part of the 
Office of War Information in 1942. Later revived by President
37
Truman, the Office of Government Reports was permanently ter
77minated by Congress m  1947.
Chart II-1 
Rooseveltfs Advisory System
The President---  Outside Advisers
The Cabinet
l e Secretary of State
2. Secretary of the Treasury
3. Secretary of War
4. Attorney General
5. Secretary of Labor
6. Secretary of Commerce
7 . Secretary of the Interior
8, Secretary of Agriculture
9. Postmaster General
2
3
4
The Executive Office
The White House Office 
Secretaries to the 
President 
Executive Clerk 
Administrative Assistants 
Bureau of the Budget 
, National Resources Planning 
Board
Liaison Office for Personnel 
Management 
, . Office of Government Reports
The .establishment of the Executive Office of the President 
was the end of a long and bitter struggle by Roosevelt to institu­
tionalize the Presidential advisory structure. As it turned out, 
it was one of the most significant events in the history of the 
Presidency. With the advent of Wbrld War II, Roosevelt needed an 
advisory structure he could call on quickly and with confidence. 
Expansion of the Executive and increased involvement of the United 
States in foreign affairs after the war made an institutionalized 
advisory system a necessity for succeeding Presidents. Today, it 
is hard to imagine how the Executive would operate without it,
77Wann, pp, 178-179,
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The Executive Office has given the Presidency a place in which 
new advisory agencies can be placed when a need for them arises, 
and, ironically gives the Congress an institution upon which it 
can focus its attention when its members feel that the power of 
the President has to be limited. New agencies placed in the 
Executive Office can be controlled by Congress, whereas, in the 
system that existed before the establishment of the Executive 
Office there was no means of control. Maybe if the members of 
Congress had realized this in 1938, they would not have fought so 
hard „
CHAPTER III
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
Established by Roosevelt as part of the Executive Office 
of the President for the purpose of easing his administrative bur­
dens, the White House Office has become the most prestigious 
agency in the Executive Office of the President. It is the center 
of activities in the Executive Branch and takes precedence over the 
other units in the Executive Office.'*' It has grown to include 
approximately 300 people, with the President utilizing 12 to 15 
special assistants who are specialists in such diverse fields as
foreign affairs, defense, welfare and education, urban problems
oand agriculture. Members of the White House Office
. . . help prepare his Cfche President fs3 messages, 
speeches, and correspondence; arrange his appointments; 
oversee the inflow and outflow of his communications, 
analyze and refine the problems confronting him; advance 
his purposes with legislators, departments, private 
groups, and party officialdom.^
It was George Washington who set the precedent of appointing
a Secretary to the President when he appointed his nephew Lawrence
-I-Edward H. Hobbs, Behind the President, A Study of Execu­
tive Office Agencies (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954),
p. 86.
^James W. Davis, Jr., The National Executive Branch, An 
Introduction (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 22.
^Louis W. Koenig, The Chief Executive (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and World, 1968), p. 159.
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Lewis to be his secretary. This position was filled by the Presi­
d e nts relatives at the President’s personal expense until 1857 
when Congress began paying the Secretary a meager salary. During 
McKinley’s Presidency, Congress dignified the position by legally 
recognizing it and raising the salary.^
When Herbert Hoover became President, the Secretary to the 
President headed a small staff of secretaries and clerks often 
borrowed from other departments. Hoover changed the custom and 
appointed three secretaries.^ Therefore, when Roosevelt became
A.
President in 1933, in addition to a clerical staff and a private 
secretary, he had legal authority for three Secretaries to the 
President.
A dominant figure in the Roosevelt White House establish­
ment until illness caused her retirement in 1943, was his private 
secretary Marguerite (Missy) LeHand. First meeting Roosevelt when 
she went to work for his campaign manager during the 1920 campaign 
for the Vice Presidency, she subsequently went to work for him when 
he became Vice President of the Fidelity and Depository Company,
accompanying him to the Governor’s Mansion in Albany, New York, and
6
to the White House. She wielded immense influence in the White 
House, as can be seen by this description written by Stanley High, 
a Roosevelt speech writer:
4Hobbs, p. 86.
5Louis Brownlow, The President and the Presidency (Chicago: 
Public Administration Service, 1949), p. 104.
^Robert A. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1952), pp. 205-206.
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Missy is the one indispensible member of the secre­
tarial entourage. She not only understands what the 
President is driving at— and approves of it--she under­
stands the President. No one else breaks in on him with 
so little hesitation or knows so well when breaking in 
would not be judicious. Her disapproval of a person or 
a course of action is more difficult to overcome than that 
of anyone else, save only Mrs. Roosevelt.^
An example of Missy*s influence was given by Edward J.
Flynn, Roosevelt*s political adviser. When Roosevelt’s first 
choice for Attorney General, Senator Thomas J. Walsh, died sud­
denly, Missy suggested appointing Homer S. Cummings to be Attorney 
General. Roosevelt did not accept the idea at first; however, the 
more he thought about it the more he liked it, and Cummings was 
appointed temporary Attorney General. Cummings did such a fine 
job that Roosevelt decided to keep him on as permanent Attorney 
General
One of the three Secretaries to the President appointed by
Roosevelt in 1933 was his Press Secretary, Stephen T. Early. Early,
an experienced newspaperman and a close friend of Roosevelt’s
since the Democratic Convention of 1912, was skillful in handling
g
the President’s frequently strained relations with the press. He 
would not take the job until he was assured that Roosevelt would 
cooperate in a liberalized press policy. Therefore, one of the 
first things Roosevelt did was to open up the Presidential Press
^7
Stanley High, Roosevelt-And Then? (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1937), pp. 32-33.
^Edward J. Flynn, You’re The Boss (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1947), pp. 125-126.
Q
Sherwood, p. 207.
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Conference. His conferences were not staged as were the press
conferences of his predecessor. They were held more frequently,
and the press was given greater access into the functioning of 
10
the government.
Another of the three Secretaries appointed by Roosevelt 
was Appointments Secretary Marvin McIntyre. McIntyre, also a 
former newspaperman, became acquainted with Roosevelt when the 
latter was Assistant Secretary of the Navy and McIntyre was Chief 
of the Press Offices of the Navy Department. He was Roosevelt’s 
Press Officer during the 1932 campaign, traveling all over the 
country with the candidate. As Appointments Secretary, McIntyre 
was particularly effective in screening those who wanted to see 
the President and in acting as a contact man between the White 
House and Capitol Hill His value was described by Stanley
High: ’’The only people who get around him belong to that inside
and unofficial family who know both Missy LeHand and the President 
well enough to make the approach through her.” McIntyre remained 
Roosevelt’s Appointments Secretary until illness forced him to give 
it up during Roosevelt’s second term. He continued to work for 
Roosevelt until his death in 1943.
The third Secretary appointed by Roosevelt after he took 
office was Louis McHenry Howe. Acting as Roosevelt’s chief of
•^Patrick Anderson, The President’s Men (Garden City: 
Doubleday, 1968), p. 59.
Sherwood, p. 208.
12High, p. 30.
staff he was given the title Secretary, while Early and McIntyre
were given the title Assistant Secretary. Howe and Roosevelt met
in 1911 when Howe, a newspaperman, was covering the New York State
Legislature. Roosevelt was a first term state senator leading an
insurgency of young Senators against the party bosses; and Howe,
an experienced political reporter, offered advice to the group.
Through this association, Roosevelt got to know Howe very well;
and in 1912 when Roosevelt ran for a second term in the New York
Legislature, he asked Howe to conduct his campaign. After Roose-
velt's election to a second term, he and Howe became permanent
13political associates.
Roosevelt was the public figure in the partnership, the 
candidate and the office holder, handling public contact and the 
questions of public policy. Howe was the behind-the-scenes figure 
in the partnership, the man behind the candidate who ”. . .  con­
centrated on the secret maneuver, the manipulation of the press,
14the organization of personal loyalties and patronage hunger."
Roosevelt depended upon Howe’s abilities as a shrewd political
15
analyst and an inescapable critic.
As Rooseveltfs assistant, Howe accompanied him to the 
Department of the Navy when Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy under Woodrow Wilson, through the campaign for Vice
■^Alfred Brooks Rollins, Roosevelt and Howe (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 61.
14Ibid.
l5Ibid.
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President in 1920, to the Governor’s Mansion when Roosevelt
became Governor of New York in 1928, and finally to the White
House when Roosevelt was elected President.
Howe met precisely the hard core of qualifications 
which Roosevelt demanded in his closest collaborators .
He was loyal almost to a fault. He could never be a 
rival. He was willing to pattern his life around the 
needs of his boss. He would be trusted never to be a 
yes man at home, but he would seldom be indiscreet and
1 f\never be treacherous abroad/0
Howe was more than an adviser to Roosevelt, he was a mem­
ber of the family, and when Roosevelt became President, Howe 
moved into the White House along with the rest of Roosevelt’s 
family, occupying the Lincoln Room. An able assistant to Roose­
velt for years, it was in the White House that Howe’s value to 
Roosevelt began to wane. Roosevelt’s need for advice and assis­
tance increased when he became Governor of New York, and increased 
even more when he became President.. Howe was primarily a polit­
ical manipulator, and Roosevelt needed intellectual talents that 
Howe lacked. Howe discovered that he had to compete with policy 
advisers. In Albany, Howe had to compete with Roosevelt’s special
counsel Samuel Rosenman, and during the Presidential campaign he
17had to compete with Roosevelt’s campaign policy advisers. Howe 
was extremely jealous of their relationships with Roosevelt, and
16T, . .Ibid.
17Anderson, p. 13.
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18 . .
this jealousy sometimes caused unneeded tensions. His limited 
intellectual talents, his petty j’ealousies, and his deteriorating 
health (he suffered from acute asthma) diminished his usefulness; 
however, Roosevelt still felt close to him and continued to con­
sult with him until he died in 1936.
Roosevelt's three Secretaries were part of what became 
known as the "Cuff Links Gang." When Roosevelt ran for Vice 
President in 1920 he gave the men who worked for him a pair of 
cuff links with "FDR" engraved on one side of the cuff links and
the recipient's initials on the other. In later years only a few
19
others were able to gain membership into this group. They
included Maj'or General Edwin M. (Pa) Watson, Roosevelt's military
aide, who later took over McIntyre's j'ob as Secretary in charge
of appointments. Watson was *'. . . adept at letting the right
20people see his chief and mollifying the disappointed; . . ."
18An example of Howe's j*ealousy can be seen in an incident 
that occurred at the 1932 Democratic Convention in Chicago. Roose­
velt was nominated to run for President and several of his campaign 
policy advisers collaborated to write his acceptance speech. When 
Roosevelt arrived from New York to accept the nomination, Howe 
insisted that Roosevelt discard the speech written by the policy 
advisers and deliver one that he, Howe, had written. Roosevelt 
accommodated. Howe by reading the first page of Howe's speech and 
the rest of his original speech. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
l^Members of the Cuff Links Gang were Howe, Early, Marvin 
McIntyre, Charles H. McCarthy, Thomas Lynch, Kirke L. Simpson, 
Stanley Prenosil, James P. Sullivan, Samuel I. Rosenman, Henry 
Morgenthau, Basil O'Connor, Henry Hooker, Harry Hopkins, Edwin M. 
Watson, Ross Mclntire, and Robert E. Sherwood. Sherwood, p. 941.
20James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), p. 9.
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It was a deep personal loss for Roosevelt when Watson died of
acute congestive heart failure and a cerebral hemorrhage in 1945
21on the way home from the Yalta Conference.
Roosevelt depended upon his small administrative staff for
personal assistance rather than political. They were ", • • not
22particularly influential on matters of public policy." However} 
they would give the President unbiased judgements and sometimes 
blunt criticism, advising on people rather than on policy. Roose­
velt expected his aides to be totally dedicated to him and to pro-
£
tect him from criticism. If he suspected an effort on the part of
one of his aides to build a power base for himself, Roosevelt would
ease him out. Those who submerged their fortunes in Roosevelt's,
for example, Marvin McIntyre, Stephen Early, and Missy LeHand,
were protected by the President. Those who became political lia-
23bilities were discarded.
Early in his administration, Roosevelt, in an effort to 
increase the assistance he needed in an expanding Executive, 
devised a method of using subordinates in Executive departments 
and agencies for White House assignments. Officially employed by 
an executive department, many of these subordinates worked full 
time as aides to the President. At times, Roosevelt would bring 
people into his service from outside of the Federal Government,
21Ibide, p. 579.
22Anderson, p. 54.
23Ibid.
giving each a job in one of the Executive agencies with the
understanding that the employee's first obligation was to the
President. For example, Raymond Moley, the head of Roosevelt's
group of policy advisers during the 1932 Presidential Campaign was
given the job of Assistant Secretary of State with the intent that
he was to be number one policy adviser and troubleshooter for the
President. The workload for this State Department position was
light and Moley would spend some of his State Department time
24working on issues important to the President,
The method of drawing White House aides from Executive
departments and agencies served a twofold purpose. Roosevelt's
most conspicuous administrative failing was that he could not
25bear firing anybody. By using employees of Executive agencies
he was not only able to increase the administrative assistance he
needed, but he was able to phase out those he no longer needed
much easier than firing them. He would simply not call on the
aide for any more assistance. The aide would continue to work at
his government department or agency until he realized that he was
no longer wanted and would resign. Often the President would drop
a hint by sending the aide on a lengthy insignificant assignment
outside of Washington. In this manner the embarrassment of an
26aide being driven from the White House was avoided.
^Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1939), pp. 115-116.
^Arthur m . Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, Vol. II 
The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1959), p. 
540.
^Louis W. Koenig, The Invisible Presidency (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 33-34.
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As President, Franklin Roosevelt personally coordinated
the Executive Branch by himself, keeping his hand in almost every
important aspect of administration and making most of the impor-
27tant decisions himself. His assistants were his leg men, his
personal liaisons working behind the scenes and reporting back to
him. They helped him coordinate. However, the reliance upon
coordinative assistance did not mean that Roosevelt delegated any
decision making authority to others.
. . .  in RooseveltTs staffing there was no place for 
a Sherman Adams. Roosevelt made and shifted the 
assignments; he was the recipient of staff work; he 
presided at informal morning staff meetings; he 
audited the service he was getting; he coordinated 
A fs report with B Ts. . . ,28
Roosevelt’s methods of administration were oftentimes
confusing to his aides. He took the competitive approach to
administration. Assignments were distinct from each other, but
bore a close relationship to each other. Aides could not do
29their jobs without watching, checking, and j'ostling one another. 
This approach brought Roosevelt ”. . . a n  effective flow of infor­
mation; it made for administrative flexibility and stimulated sub-
30ordinates to effective performance.” Roosevelt was basically a
A. J. Wann, The President As Chief Administrator, A 
Study of Ftanklin D. Roosevelt (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs 
Press, 1968), p. 32.
28Richard E. Neustadt, ’’Approaches to Staffing the Presi­
dency,” The American Political Science Review, LVII (December 1963), 
858.
29Ibid., p. 857.
30J Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 537.
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lone operator and worked best through his individual assistants, 
singling out one assistant as his number one administrative 
assistant, his "troubleshooter.’’
Roosevelt’s first troubleshooter was Louis Howe, who 
enjoyed his greatest influence before Roosevelt became President. 
Howe is significant because he is the one who set the pattern for 
those troubleshooters who followed. The duties he performed 
unselfishly for Roosevelt were the duties subsequent trouble­
shooters were expected to perform, and with the same type of
31loyalty and devotion. Few of them equalled Howe’s dedication.
After the 1932 election, Roosevelt relied heavily upon
Raymond Moley for troubleshooting duties. Moley was recommended
to Roosevelt by Sam Rosenman to help organize Roosevelt’s cam-
32paign policy advisers, and after the election Moley ’’. . .
33
suddenly found himself the ’packhorse’ of the Roosevelt train.’’
Moley was given the job of giving some direction to the army of
34idea men invading Washington. He was used as an intermediary 
with potential Cabinet members, and as chief speech writer for 
Roosevelt. It was Moley’s job ”. . .to sift proposals for him, 
discuss facts and ideas with him, and help him crystallize his own
33-Anderson, p. 20.
82Samuel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1952), pp. 57-58.
33Rollins, p. 367.
34Ibid., p . 368.
50
35policy." Moley became Roosevelt’s liaison with Congress and
government agencies involved in new legislative proposals. He
. brought together Wallace, Tugwell, Mbrgenthau, and M. L.
Wilson to draft a farm program. He set Berle and others to work
on mortgage relief and transportation. He assigned Samuel Unter-
3 6
myer and Charles Taussig to work on securities legislation."
Differences developed between Moley and Roosevelt during 
the first term which undermined Moley’s influence in the adminis­
tration. At the London Economic Conference of 193 3, where 66 
countries met tx> discuss worldwide economic problems, Moley was 
embarrassed by Roosevelt when the President repudiated an agree­
ment Moley had made at the conference. Also, Moley had been sent 
to the Conference when the American delegation, headed by the 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, seemed to be in disarray, thus 
causing hard feelings with Hull. Hull complained to Roosevelt 
that Moley tried to undercut his authority at the Conference and 
make him look bad in the eyes of the President. When IVfoley 
returned to the United States, Roosevelt did nothing to try and 
placate him. Shortly after this incident Moley resigned to turn 
his efforts toward establishing the Today magazine. He continued
to help write some of Roosevelt’s speeches through 1934 and 1935,
37
but gradually faded from Roosevelt’s circle of advisers.
35Moley, p. 55. 
3^Rollins, p. 368. 
37Moley, pp. 238-277.
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Moley was replaced for a while by another policy adviser, 
Rexford Tugwell, but starting in 1934 two young government lawyers, 
Tommy Corcoran and Ben Cohen, were used increasingly by the Presi­
dent. Corcoran was recommended to Roosevelt by Roosevelt’s friend 
Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter was worried about the increasing 
burdens of the Presidency and Roosevelt’s attempts to shoulder 
them all himself. He suggested that Roosevelt needed a young,
intelligent, energetic man to act as troubleshooter, and he recom-
38
mended Corcoran. Corcoran was teamed with Cohen who was ”. • „ ,
the academic type, a calm, quiet and unemotional scholar, a modest 
39philosopher.’’ Tommy Corcoran and Ben Cohen were Roosevelt’s
chief troubleshooters from 1936 until 1940. ’’Corcoran was premier
odd jobber around the White House--leg man, troubleshooter, and
40expediter, all rolled into one.” Cohen was more of a behind-
the-scenes worker, drafting laws and giving legal advice.
As helpful as Roosevelt’s troubleshooters were they were
still only officials of the President’s household. They were not
officers in any chain of administrative command, and they did not
have the legal authority to act for the President. The lines of
41authority still converged in the White House.
S^Grace Tully, F.D ,R. My Boss (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1949), p. 141.
39Ibid., p. 142.
40Beverly Smith, ’’Corcoran and Cohen,” The American Maga­
zine, August, 1937, p. 125.
^Sherwood, p. 209.
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. . . Roosevelt used these special assistants in an 
unofficial, informal, irregular, and sometimes hap­
hazard manner to aid him in maintaining contacts with 
his subordinate administrators, to find out for him 
specific information he wanted about administrative 
activities, and to help him work out agreements and 
better relationships among the representatives of the 
various agencies 0 He seems to have regarded them as a 
sort of extension of himself; they were to do some of 42 
the things which he did not have time to do for himself*
When Roosevelt began his campaign to reorganize the Execu­
tive he made it clear to the reorganization committee that he 
wanted additional administrative assistants provided for in its 
report* The final report called for six assistants. In 1939, 
when the Executive Office of the President was established, the 
six administrative assistants were incorporated into the White 
House Office, Roosevelt’s troubleshooters, prototypes of the six 
administrative assistants, were legally recognized.
Their function would be, when any matter was presented 
to ihe President for action affecting any part of the 
administrative work of the Government, to assist him in 
obtaining quickly and without delay all pertinent infor­
mation possessed by any of the executive departments so as 
to guide him in making his responsible decisions; and then 
when decisions have been made, to assist him in seeing to 
it that every administrative department and agency affected 
is promptly informed,4^
The power to establish the six administrative assistants 
was given to Roosevelt when Congress passed the Reorganization Act 
of 1939 and subsequently approved his first reorganization plan 
asking permission to establish the Executive Office of the Presi­
dent, Roosevelt took advantage of this grant of power when he
42Wann, pp. 39-40.
42Report of the Committee on Administrative Management,
p • 5 *
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issued Executive Order Nd e 8248 on September 8, 1939, establish­
ing the Executive Office and including within it the White House 
Office, The White House Office consisted of the three Secretaries 
to the President which were made a part of the White House Staff 
in Hoover's administration; the Executive Clerk, instituted to
organize and supervise all clerical services and procedures in the
44White House Office; and, the six administrative assistants.
Since the establishment of the White House Office, new
positions have been created. In 1941, two new positions, Special
Assistant to the President and Special Executive Assistant, were
created, and, in 1944, Roosevelt added the office of Special
Counsel to the President, appointing Judge Samuel Rosenman to the 
45post. Through the years the composition of the White House 
Office has fluctuated; however, the size has gradually increased. 
Today, there are many assistants working in the White House, 
variously referred to as Administrative Assistants, Special 
Assistants, Deputy Assistants, Deputy Counsels, or Counsels, and 
they all exist to help the President accomplish his administrative 
duties. Since its establishment by Roosevelt it has become the 
nerve center of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.
44Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, VIII (London; Macmillan and Co., Limited, 
1941), p. 491.
45Hobbs, p. 87.
CHAPTER IV
THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
The Bureau of the Budget was established with enactment of 
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1'921 • Established as part of the 
Treasury Department, it was intended to be a staff agency to help 
the President carry out his responsibilities for effective public 
management Among those management responsibilities was the 
preparation of the executive budget.
Up until 1921 financial requests were prepared and sub­
mitted separately by the departments and branches of the Federal
Government. The Treasury Department assembled them and presented
2
them to Congress for approval. The budget idea did not catch on 
in the Federal Government until costs reached two billion dollars 
and there was an outcry from the people against excessive govern- 
ment expenditures .
William H. Taft was the first President to push for a 
regular executive budget, establishing in 1911 the Commission on 
Economy and Efficiency to investigate five administrative areas,
i
Percival Flack Brundage, The Bureau of the Budget (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. vii.
2Ibid., p. 3.
3
Edward H. Hobbs, Behind The President, A Study of Execu­
tive Office Agencies (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954), 
p. 22.
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the first of which was the budget as an annual financial program.
The Committeefs report, "The Need for a National Budget," was
transmitted to the Congress, and, despite its recommendations on
the need for an annual budget and how it should be prepared, the
4report was ignored. In 1913, Taft submitted a budget to Congress 
for consideration and in the message accompanying the budget 
recommended ". . . a  central accounting, auditing, and reporting 
organization which would include among its activities the prepara­
tion of a budget . . . . "^
With the involvement of the United States in the First 
World War the national debt rose, and in 1919, it was $25.5 bil­
lion. The method of each agency separately submitting fiscal 
requests unrelated to each other or to the total of all amounts 
recommended to Congress through the Treasury Department was inade- 
quate. A resolution, therefore, was introduced in the House of
Representatives to appoint a select committee to study the matter
7
and report to the House. At the same time, a committee was also 
formed in the Senate to study the subject. In 1920, a bill was 
passed in the Senate, and another one in the House of Representatives.
4Ibid„, pp. 23-24.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Message of the President Sub­
mitting a Budget, S. Doc. 1113, 62d Cong., 3d sess., 1913.
^Brundage,: p. 10.
^U.S., Congress, House, A Resolution Establishing a 
Special Committee on a Budget System, H. Res. 168, 66th Cong.,
1st sess., Jul. 31, 1919, Congressional Record, LVTII, 3431.
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The Senate bill called for an enlarged office of the Secretary of 
the Treasury with an internal bureau responsible for the prepara­
tion of the budget, and the House bill provided for the creation 
of a budget bureau directly under the President. A compromise 
bill was passed, sent back by President Wilson because of a tech­
nicality, and was eventually signed by President Harding on June 
10, 1921* The compromise provided for a director of the budget
and his assistant, appointed by the President, working under his
9
orders, but located m  the Treasury Department.
The 1920*s were years of stabilization for the Bureau of 
the Budget. However, a significant development occurred during 
Harding1s administration that became a part of the regular pro­
cedure of the Bureau of the Budget. With the establishment of 
the Bureau, "federal agencies were no longer able to decide for 
themselves what appropriations they could ask for from Congress. 
Procedures were established whereby all agency proposals for 
legislation involving public funds had to be submitted to the 
Bureau. Budget Director Chairles G. Dawes issued Budget Circular 
49 on December 19, 1921, outlining the procedure. Requests or 
recommendations were to be sent by the executive department or
^Senator Medill McCormack of Illinois explained the dif­
ferences in the two bills on the floor of the Senate. U.S., 
Congress, Senate, 66th Cong., 2d sess., April 30, 1920, Congres­
sional Record, LIX, 6266-6271.
^Brundage, p. 12. 
l^Ibid., p. 106*
57
agency to the Director of the Budget who in turn would make recom­
mendations to the President. The head of the executive department 
or agency concerned was to ascertain, through the Director of the 
Budget, if the request or recommendation was in accord with the 
financial program of the President After approval by the
President, agency proposals were then sent to Congress with the
12Bureau's statement of advice.
During Harding's administration these legislative clear­
ance procedures were not strictly enforced, but when Coolidge 
became President they were strongly enforced, with a tendency 
towards fiscal conservation. President Hoover also enforced the
procedures, emphasizing the relationship of central clearance to
13budgetary control.
When Franklin Roosevelt became President there was a lack 
of concern about, and understanding of, the procedures of central 
clearance. The new administration was so busy it was not able to 
enforce the procedures. It was not until early 1934 that the 
Budget Bureau made efforts to persuade departments to comply with 
the procedures, but it was a year later that Roosevelt took an 
active role in establishing compliance with clearance procedures. 
At that time Roosevelt introduced the first of three innovations
11Ibid., quoting Budget Circular 49, issued December 19,
1921.
■^Richard E. Neustadt, "Presidency and Legislation: The 
Growth of Central Clearance,” American Political Science Review, 
XLVIII (September 1954), 644.
l3Ibid., pp. 644-647.
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leading to expanded jurisdiction of legislative clearance by the 
Bureau of the Budget. In an effort to stop the practice of un­
coordinated agency requests for legislation, he introduced policy 
clearance.'*'4'
Executive departments and agencies had been seeking the 
passage of favorable legislation in the Congress without Roose­
velts knowledge. Therefore, clearance was made a requirement of 
all agency proposals for policy legislation, and Roosevelt 
designated the National Emergency Council as the clearing agency. 
Appropriations measures were still to be cleared through the 
Budget Bureau. By 1936, the National Emergency Council had 
become a little used agency in the Executive, and in 1937, the 
Presidents Committee on Administrative Management recommended 
‘that the Budget Bureau take over the clearance duties of the 
National Emergency Council.
During recent years the Bureau of the Budget has 
functioned as an agency for the President in the clear­
ance of the fiscal aspects of legislative measures pro­
posed by the executive departments. This clearance is 
of value to the Congress and to the departments and is 
essential to the exercise of the authority and responsi­
bility of the President. It should be applied to all 
legislation proposed by the executive departments and 
agencies and should not be limited to fiscal considera­
tions . The Bureau of the Budget could well take over 
the present duties of the National Emergency Council in 
this respect.^
14Ibid., pp. 647-649.
15Report of the President1s Committee on Administrative 
Management (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 20.
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The demise of the National Emergency Council resulted in the
transfer in 1937 to the Bureau of the Council Ts authority to clear
16non-fiscal legislation.
During the period in which the Bureau was being estab­
lished as clearance agency for policy legislation, Roosevelt insti­
tuted two more clearance procedures. In 1936, Roosevelt gave the 
Bureau the duty of assisting the President in the consideration,
17clearance, and preparation of executive orders and proclamations. 
Also, Roosevelt established the Bureau as the circulating and 
correlating agency for all enrolled bills sent to the White House 
by Congress. Before the 1930*s, when an enrolled bill from Con­
gress reached the White House it would be circulated by the Presi­
dent’s Secretary or Executive Clerk among the agencies concerned 
with the bill. The bill would be passed by hand, with agency 
recommendations and criticisms filtering back to the White House 
for the White House Staff to correlate. All this had to be done 
within the ten days the President had to veto the bill. The Presi­
dent’s time for consideration of agency replies before making up 
his mind was short because of the lack of expediency within the
system. By 1938, Roosevelt had the Bureau of the Budget handling
18almost all enrolled bills.
"^Neustadt, ’’Central Clearance,” p. 652.
17Brundage, p. 23.
^®Neustadt, ’’Central Clearance,” pp. 654-655.
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The Bureau improved the system of circulating and corre­
lating by having facsimile copies of each enrolled bill prepared 
by the Public Printer for the Congress sent to the Bureau at the 
same time the original was sent back to Congress for the Speaker’s 
and Vice President’s signature. These copies were distributed to 
the agencies involved in the bill before the bill officially 
reached the White House, thus, giving the Bureau a head start on 
the ten days the President had to veto. Later, the stipulation 
was added requiring agency replies, accompanied by recommendations, 
be submitted within 48 hours after receipt. A recommendation 
against the bill was to have a draft veto message or memorandum of
disapproval attached. Responsibility for overseeing these activ-
19ities was vested in the Bureau’s Division of Coordination.
The Division of Coordination was formed into a separate
division in 1938. After the passage of the Reorganization Act of
1939, it became the Division of Legislative Reference, and in 1952
its name was changed to Office of Legislative Reference. During
World War II, the Office of War Mobilization handled some of the
clearance functions, but when James Webb became Budget Director in
201946 full responsibility shifted back to the Bureau. Today, the
Office of Legislative Reference is the number one
«, o • clearing agency for legislation to be drafted and 
submitted, for analyses of bills that have already been 
introduced in Congress, for obtaining departmental views 
on those bills, for determining the relationship of
19Ibid., p. 655.
^Brundage, p. 108.
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legislation to the program of the President; and for 
coordinating the departmental viewpoints to be expressed 
in testimony.
In addition to recommending that the Bureau of the Budget 
take over the responsibilities of the National Emergency Council 
for clearing policy legislation, The Report of the President’s 
Committee on Administrative Management was responsible for further 
changes involving the Bureau. The Committee recommended that the 
Director of the Bureau be relieved of routine duties so that he 
could devote himself to problems of fiscal policy and planning.
It also recommended that the preparation of the budget be super­
vised by the Bureau of the Budget, that the administration research 
function of the Bureau be adequately developed to aid the Presi­
dent, that the information function of the Bureau be developed
and improved, and that the Bureau should serve in various ways as
22
an agency of the President.
To accomplish the recommendations made by the President’s 
Committee, when Roosevelt established the Executive Office of the 
President, he included the Bureau of the Budget within it. Roose­
velt believed that it was necessary to transfer the Bureau out of 
the Treasury Department and into the Executive Office because it 
would facilitate the Bureau’s coordinating activities and its
2lIbid., p. 111.
on
The Report of The President’s Committee on Administra­
tive Management, p. 20.
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research and investigational activities. The Bureau was given 
the following duties to perform as a member of the Executive 
Office of the President:
a. To assist the President in the preparation of the 
Budget and the formulation of the fiscal program of the 
Government.
b. To supervise and control the administration of the 
Budget.
c. To conduct research in the development of improved 
plans of administrative management, and to advise the 
executive departments and agencies of the Government with 
respect to improved administrative organization and practice.
d. To aid the President to bring about more efficient 
and economical conduct of Government service.
e. To assist the President by clearing and coordinating 
departmental advice on proposed legislation and by making 
recommendations as to Presidential action in legislative 
enactments, in accordance with past practice.
f. To assist in the consideration and clearance and, 
where necessary, in the preparation of proposed Executive 
orders and proclamations, . . .
g. To plan and promote the improvement, development, 
and coordination of Federal and other statistical services.
h. To keep the President informed of the progress of 
activities by agencies of the Government with respect to 
work proposed, work actually initiated, and work completed, 
together with the relative timing of work among the several 
agencies of the Government; . . ,24
In 1939, Roosevelt appointed Harold D. Smith Director of 
the Bureau of the Budget. Smithfs concept of the Bureau1s main 
function made him the right man to implement the changes made by 
Roosevelt. Smith believed that the main function of the Bureau 
was 11. „ .to serve as an agent of the President in coordinating
23Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses Of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, VIII (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 
1941), p. 250.
24Ibid., p. 492.
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operations and in improving the administrative management of the 
25government»” The Bureau’s functions were expanded beyond trying 
to insure the balancing of the budget, to a point where it became 
an important management and advisory tool to be used by the Presi­
dent. A. J. Wann considers it to be the backbone of the Executive 
Office of the President. Edward H. Hobbs also calls it the
backbone of the Executive Office and declares it to be the most
27
highly organized of all the Executive Office agencies.
Roosevelt made the Bureau of the Budget a strong adminis­
trative arm of the Presidency. By making it responsible for super­
vising legislation proposed by Executive departments, and advising 
on legislation passed by Congress and sent to the President for 
approval, Roosevelt gave the Bureau the responsibility of 
coordinating the President’s legislative program. Roosevelt’s 
transferring of the Bureau out of the Treasury Department into the 
Executive Office made it the President’s agency, eliminating the 
handicap of sharing authority with the Secretary of the Treasury. 
The increased emphasis on advisory and management functions, 
initiated by Roosevelt, is reflected in the changing of the 
Bureau’s name in 1970 by President Nixon to the Office of Manage­
ment and Budget.
J. Wann, The President As Chief Administrator, A 
Study of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Washington, D .C.: Public Affairs 
Press, 1968), pp. 179-181.
^Hobbs, p. 21.
CHAPTER V
THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
The planning for a peacetime economy, undertaken by Con­
gress after World War II, resulted in the passage of the Full 
Employment Act of 1946 and the establishment of the Council of 
Economic Advisers. Composed of three members appointed by the
y
President, the Council is located in the Executive Office of the
President, and due to the training and experience of each member,
. . . is exceptionally qualified to analyze and inter­
pret developments, to appraise programs and activities 
of the Government . . . , and to formulate and recommend 
national economic policy to promote employment, production, 
and purchasing power under free competitive enterprise.*^*
It is given the responsibility of keeping . . the President
fully informed of economic developments and emerging problems which
2may affect the Nation’s economy.”
The Council has several important responsibilities in 
addition to keeping the President informed. It participates in 
varieties of more formal committees, task forces, and studies; and 
it represents the United States in a number of important inter­
national conferences. The Council is also given the responsibility
Full Employment Act, Statutes at Large, LX, sec. 4(a), 
24 (1946), U.S. Code, Vol. Ill, sec. 1023(a) (1970).
^Economic Report of the President (Washington: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 201.
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to explain and clarify the Administration’s economic policies 
through speeches, articles, press briefings, statements, congres­
sional testimony, an annual report, and assistance in the prepara-
3
tion of the President’s Economic Report.
The efforts by Congress to establish post-war economic
planning was an implicit recognition of the guidance and direction
Franklin Roosevelt and his circle of economic advisers gave to
4
domestic economic policy. On the other hand, these efforts by 
Congress to establish economic planning and create a Council of 
Economic Advisers were also a reaction to the practice of economic 
policy being determined by inner circles and invisible advisers, 
Roosevelt’s Brains Trust for example, without any Congressional 
controls.5
Mud legislation passed during Roosevelt’s
first one hundred days in office was a product of the thinking of 
a group of inen gathered together to act as Roosevelt’s economic 
policy advisers before the Presidential election of 1932. This 
group, composed mainly of college professors, was dubbed the
3Ibid., p. 202.
^Lester G. Seligman, ffPresidential Leadership: The Inner 
Circle and Institutionalization,” The Journal of Politics, XVIII 
(August 1956), 418.
5Ibid., p. 419.
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’’Brains Trust” by a New York Times reporter.^
The Brains Trust came into existence shortly after Roose­
velt announced his candidacy for President of the United States in 
January, 1932. There are conflicting claims by Samuel Rosenman 
and Raymond Moley as to who originated the idea of the Brains Trust. 
Rosenman claims he first suggested the idea to Roosevelt one eve­
ning in March, 1932, and Roosevelt liked it so well he gave
7
approval to go ahead with it„ Moley claims that Roosevelt had 
spoken to him about the idea that winter and it, therefore, had
Q
already been in the air before March.
While Roosevelt was Governor of New York he had frequently
9
consulted with college professors on legislative policy; so, 
regardless of from whence the idea of using college professors as 
advisers came, Roosevelt was receptive to it. It was felt that 
college professors could supply the country with some fresh new 
economic ideas. In his March conversation with Roosevelt, Rosen­
man succinctly expressed the reasons for choosing college profes­
sors as advisers:
^Louis Howe referred to the group derisively as "your 
brains trust” in a conversation with Roosevelt, and Roosevelt used 
it in a news conference shortly afterward. One of the reporters at 
the news conference used it in his news article the next day and 
the title stuck. Samuel I, Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 81.
7Ibid., pp. 56-57.
o
Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1939), pp. 8-9.
^William E. Leuchtenburg, F.D.R. and The New Deal, 1932- 
1940 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 32.
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Usually in a situation like this, . . • , a can­
didate gathers around him a group composed of some 
successful industrialists, some big financiers, and 
some national political leaders. I think we ought to 
steer clear of all those. They all seem to have failed 
to produce anything constructive to solve the mess 
w e ’re in today.10
Raymond Moley was asked to recommend those he thought 
would aid Roosevelt in mapping out his economic strategy for the 
Presidential campaign. A list was drawn up by Moley and the per­
sons were interviewed one by one by Roosevelt, Moley, Rosenman, 
and Doc O'Connor/^ with the recommendation accepted or rejected 
by Roosevelt. By this method two men were chosen to become mem­
bers of the Brains Trust, Rexford G. Tugwell and Adolf A.Berle,
T 1 2Jr.
The final composition of the Brains Trust consisted of
Moley, an authority on public law who emerged as the leader of the
group; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., an expert in corporation law who was
recruited because of the work he was involved in on the nature and
13
the control of corporations; and Rexford G. Tugwell, the first 
man recommended to Roosevelt by Moley, and an authority on agri­
cultural economics. An agricultural economist was chosen because, 
according to Moley, ,Tthe obvious beginning of our discontents in
10Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 57.
1 1D. Basil (Doc) O fConnor was Roosevelt’s former law part­
ner and an adviser of Roosevelt’s while Roosevelt was Governor of 
New York*
12Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, pp. 58-59.
"^Moley, p. 18.
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this country was the persistence of the delusion that the nation
14
could prosper while its farmers went begging," Sam Rosenman 
and Doc O ’Connor, as established advisers to Roosevelt, also 
became members of the group. Charles William Taussig, President 
and Chairman of the Board of the American Molasses Company and 
Hugh S. Johnson, protege of financier Bernard M. Baruch and even­
tual administrator of the National Recovery Administration, worked 
in close association with the group, as did Key Pittman, Senator 
from Nevada.
From the time of its inception to the day Roosevelt took 
office as President of the United States, the purpose of the 
Brains Trust was to help find specific remedies to apply to Roose­
velt’s general objectives of economic recovery. As a group, they 
mapped, out economic strategy with Roosevelt for hours at a time 
with the discussion many times lasting until very late at night.
As individuals, members of the Brains Trust would make studies in
their particular fields of expertise and present them to Roose- 
15velt.
As economic policy advisers, the Brains Trust advanced the 
economic philosophy of cooperation amongst government, business, 
labor, and agriculture, and the abandonment of laissez faire.
They believed that in a modern industrial society problems of 
price-wage-profit behavior and the allocation of resources could
14lbid., pp. 14-15.
^^Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, pp. 63-65.
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be handled only by integration of private and public planning.
Their efforts were aimed at devising institutional means of
associating business, labor, agriculture, and government in this 
16process.
The speeches written by the Brains Trust during the cam­
paign contained the germs of what was to come when Roosevelt became 
President. In the "Forgotten Man" speech made on the radio in 
Albany, New York, April 7, 1932, Roosevelt placed emphasis on the 
man at the bottom of the economic ladder. Written by Moley, the
speech contained the seeds of several of Roosevelt’s future
17
national recovery projects. Hinting at the need for a planned
economy, Roosevelt discussed restoration of purchasing power to
the farming half of the country, the prevention of foreclosures of
home and farm mortgages, assistance to small banks as well as
18large, and the reduction of tariff barriers. Subsequent cam­
paign speeches concentrated on the themes of economic planning and 
cooperation, and social responsibility. At a Jefferson Day Dinner 
later in April of 1932, he attacked the laxity in regulating pub­
lic utilities and blamed dwindling American foreign trade on high
19tariffs instituted by the Republicans. At Oglethorpe University 
in May he referred to the securities industry as
•^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, Vol. 
Ill: The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1960), 
p. 389.
^Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 61.
l8Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, I (New York: Russell and Russell, 1938), p. 
626.
19Ibid.s pp. 627-639.
. . • that small group of men whose chief outlook upon 
the social welfare is tinctured by the fact that they 
can make huge profits from the lending of money and the 
marketing of securities--an outlook which deserves the 
adjective "selfish" and "opportunist".20
In later speeches, he discussed tariff barriers; concentration of
economic power; needed supervision of security sales and exchanges,
bank deposits, and holding companies; separation of investment
banking from commercial banking; farm relief; public utilities;
public works; public health and welfare; long range planning for
unemployment; and the interdependence of business interests with
j.
those of agriculture and labor.
When Roosevelt took office in 1933 the Brains Trust ceased 
to exist as a formal group. However, several members took jobs in 
the federal government and stayed on as advisers to Roosevelt, 
helping him institute the New Deal for America he had pledged in 
his nomination acceptance speech. Moley became Assistant Secretary 
of State and remained the President’s chief speech writer and 
assistant, while Tugwell took the job of Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture and Hugh Johnson became the administrator of the 
National Recovery Administration.
The National Recovery Administration was established 
shortly after Roosevelt became President to accomplish the goal of 
industrial planning. It was to administer the provisions of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act. According to the act, trade or 
industrial associations, or other groups representing an industry, 
were to apply to the Administration for approval of codes of fair
20Ibid., p. 642.
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competition. Section 7a provided for collective bargaining, maxi­
mum hours, and minimum wages; title II provided for a Public Works 
Administration. The purpose of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act was
. . .  to remove obstructions to the free flow of inter­
state and foreign commerce which tend to diminish the 
amount thereof; and to provide for and maintain united 
action of labor and management under adequate govern­
mental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair 
competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible 
utilization of the present productive capacity of 
industries, to avoid undue restriction of production 
(except as may be temporarily required), to increase 
purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, 
to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to reha­
bilitate industry and to conserve natural resources
The Act was the result of pressure from diverse sources
striving to solve the problems of industrial recovery. Pressures
came from business advocating protection of prices and profits,
from trade unions advocating the protection of labor standards,
from those who considered the existing competitive system competing
22
at the expense.of human decency.
The Agricultural Adjustment Administration was instituted 
to administer the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
which was passed in an effort to restore the purchasing power of 
farmers for industrial products by lowering the disparity between 
prices of agricultural and other commodities. As a part of the
pi
The National Industrial Recovery Act, XLVIII, sec. 1, 
195 (1933).
^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, Vol. 
The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 
1959), p. 94.
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act, provision was made for the farmer to receive a subsidy for
23limiting output, thereby, reducing surpluses and raising prices.
Through the activities of the National Recovery Administra­
tion business activity showed marked gains, and the Agricultural
24Adjustment. Administration helped halt the fall in farm prices.
The concept of national economic coordination helped mobilize the 
nation's industry; however, problems of enforcing the National 
Recovery Administration codes existed. In the effort to estab­
lish economic cooperation Roosevelt discovered that many corpora­
tion executives
. . .  openly flouted or skirted around all provisions of 
the NRA which were not entirely favorable to them, 
assailed most of the other New Deal measures, and spent 
millions of dollars trying to convince the country that 
Roosevelt was an egomaniacal Communist
Roosevelt's cooperative program stopped the downward spiral,
but it did not accomplish enough toward recovery. The little man
had not been taken care of. National income was up, cash income
for farmers was up, unemployment had declined, but the figures
Of\
nowhere matched those of the pre-depression years. Five million
27were still unemployed and on the relief roles .
^John Major, ed., The New Deal (New York: Barnes and 
Noble, Inc., 1967), p. 60.
^^Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 362.
^Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, pp. 1-3.
^Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal 1933-1938 (New 
York: Creative Age Press, Inc., 1944), p. 158.
73
In January of 1935 Roosevelt announced that the new goal
of recovery was going to be social justice. Recovery would be
brought about by putting purchasing power into the hands of the
least privileged groups and the policy of supporting economic
policies of the business world was to be abandoned. The reason
for this change of policy was the fact that although the economy
had made some progress toward recovery, Roosevelt’s previous pro-
28gram had not reached the average American. The attitude of big
business, the failure of his program to reach the little man, the
actions of the Supreme Court in declaring Roosevelt’s recovery
actions unconstitutional, and pressure from anti-big-business
29interests pushed Roosevelt toward the left.
Roosevelt’s change in philosophy was marked by a slow
turnover in advisers„ In 1935 the Brains Trusters were replaced
as policy advisers by a group of young lawyers who were proteges
of Felix Frankfurter and influenced by the philosophy of Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who ”. . .  believed not only in
close government regulation of the corporation but in breaking up
their monopolies and restoring competitive conditions in favor of
30the small businessman.” Eventually this group of lawyers in the 
school of Brandeis was j'oined by a group of economists in the
28Ibid., pp. 156-159.
29Goldman, Rendezvous, p. 362.
^Major, p. 79.
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31school of Keynes, John Maynard Keynes, English economist,
believed that declining private expenditures could be compensated
for by increasing government expenditures. Keynes theorized that
national income was the sum of consumption and investment, and,
if people stop consuming and investing, national income will fall*
The only way to increase national income,.according to Keynes, was
by increasing either consumption expenditures or investment
expenditures or both, and if private enterprise could not accora-
. 32plish this task there were governmental means of doing it.
The influence of men like Moley, Tugwell, Berle, and
Johnson, members of the First New Deal declined. They were
replaced by figures of the Second New Deal, Frankfurter, Corcoran,
Cohen, James M. Landis, Leon Henderson, Marriner S. Eccles,
33William 0. Douglas, and Laughlin Currie. The "soak the rich"
tax in 1935, the Public Utility Holding Company Act, and the Fair
Labor Standards Act are all attributable to this new group of 
34advisers. The shift was from a managed to a mixed economy. The 
First New Dealers tried to convert business through new institu­
tions, whereas, the Second New Dealers tried to discipline it
35through new laws. "The First New Deal characteristically told 
31Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, p* 387.
qp
Stephen Kemp Bad.ley, Congress Makes a Law, The Story 
Behind The Employment Act of 1946 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1950), p. 17.
33Schlesinger, Upheaval, p. 387.
^4Seligman, p. 414.
^^Schlesinger, Upheaval, p. 392.
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business what it must do. The Second New Deal characteristically
36told business what it must not do.”
The expression ’’Brains Trust” stayed on to be applied to
those new policy advisers, and throughout his years in office
those advisers closest to Roosevelt were referred to as members
of his Brains Trust. The expression
. • • came to have kind of generic connotation. In the 
New York Times index . c . as many references to the term 
can be found in 1936 as in 1933. But by that time, or 
even earlier, it had been expanded to include not only 
all university people in Washington but all those who 
might be called intellectuals#3'
Roosevelt’s move away from national economic coordination
and toward an anti-monopoly philosophy is illustrated in a message
Roosevelt delivered to Congress April 29, 1938. In the message
he attacked big business and proposed a program to control it.
Private enterprise is ceasing to be free enterprise 
and is becoming a cluster of private collectivisms; 
masking itself as a system of free enterprise after the 
American model, it is in fact becoming a concealed 
cartel system after the European model.38
He told Congress that there was no plan to abandon the anti-trust 
laws as a means of controlling business, and, in order to streng­
then them, he was going to ask for an additional $200,000 in the
budget for the Department of Justice to use in anti-trust investi- 
39gations.
36ibid.
37pexford G. Tugwell, The Brains Trust (New York: The 
Viking Press, 1968), p* xxx*
38Franklin Roosevelt, ’’Stop Collectivism in Business” in 
New Deal Thought, edited by Howard Zinn (Indianapolis: The Bobbs- 
Merrill Company, Inc., 1966), p. 125.
39Ibid., pp. 128-129.
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Rooseveltfs administration marked the advance of the role 
of the economist in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government 
from tactical to strategic0 There was an increase in use of pro­
fessionally trained economists as advisers at the policy-making 
level rather than as technicians at the operative level, and in 
1939 when Roosevelt established the Executive Office of the Presi­
dent and institutionalized his advisory system, he included several
40economists in his group of Assistants «, According to Edwin G. 
Nourse, the first Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, 
this staffing, along with the advice that came to the President 
from the economists on the National Resources Planning Board, set 
the pattern of economic advisership in the Executive Office of the 
President in 1945 when the Full Employment Act was first pro­
posed
The National Resources Planning Board, an agency included 
in the original Executive Office, grew out of the National Plan­
ning Board of the Public Works Administration created by Roosevelt
in 1934. In 1939 it became the central long-range economic plan-
42ning agency for the Executive Branch. Roosevelt defined the 
BoardTs duties as follows:
Edwin G. Nourse, Economics in the Public Service, Admin 
istrative Aspects of the Employment Act (New York: Hair court,
Brace and Co., 1953), pp. 89-91.
^Bailey, pp. 25-26.
42Ibid.
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a. To survey, collect data on, and analyze problems 
pertaining to national resources, both natural and human, 
and to recommend to the President and the Congress long­
time plans and programs for the wise use and fullest 
development of such resources,
b. To consult with Federal, regional, state, local, 
and private agencies in developing orderly programs of 
public works and to list for the President and the Con­
gress all proposed public works in the order of their 
relative importance with respect to 1 . the greatest food 
to the greatest number of people, 2 . the emergency 
necessities of the Nation, and 3* the social, economic, 
and cultural advancement of the people of the United 
States•
c« To inform the President of the general trend of 
economic conditions and to recommend measures leading to 
their improvement of stabilization,
do To act as a clearing house and means of coordina­
tion for planning activities, linking together various 
levels and fields of planning,43
The National Resources Planning Board was terminated in 
1943 when Congress cut off appropriations, but, before its 
demise, the Board submitted a report to Roosevelt outlining an 
economic bill of rights and suggesting postwar economic policy. 
This report was transmitted to Congress, and, according to 
Stephen Bailey, represents better than any single document of the 
war years the progressive postwar thinking in the Federal Govern­
ment, and was an impetus to those forces which combined to make
44possible the introduction of the Full Employment Bill in 1945,
Roosevelt was responsible for placing the responsibility 
for planning the nation’s economy directly in the hands of the
Samuel I • Rosenman, The Pub1ic Papers and Addresses of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, VIII (London: Macmillan and Go,, Limited,
1941), p. 493.
^Bailey, pp. 26-27.
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Executive. Thus, the passage of the Full Employment Act of 1946
confirmed his economic leadership and institutionalized his
initiatives. The Act made the President responsible for the
nation’s economy. At the same time, Congress took steps to
45limit, restrict, and contain the President’s power. Congress
established the Council of Economic Advisers to perform the
functions performed by Roosevelt ’s circle of advisers and the
National Resources Planning Board, but the Council was made
responsible to both the President and the Congress. In the Act,
Congress defined the type of personnel to be placed on the
Council, required that they be confirmed by the Senate, made it
a statutory body funded by Congress, required that the President’s
Economic Report be submitted to a Joint Committee of Congress to
46h e  studied and approved.
The decision to establish a statutory body of economists 
to advise the President was made after testimony had been given 
before the House of Representative’s Committee on Expenditures in 
the Executive Branch. Economist George Terborgh, in his influ­
ential testimony, called for a small independent commission,
47appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. In an 
45Seligman, p. 419.
46Ibid.s pp. 418-419.
47U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the 
Executive Departments, Full Employment Act of 1945, Hearings,
House of Representatives, on H. R. 2202, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 
1945, p. 613.
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obvious reference to Roosevelt*s advisers, Terbprgh stated the 
following:
. . « both the economic analysis and the economic policy 
may be prepared and promoted by men unknown to the pub­
lic, whose appointment has not been confirmed by Congress, 
and who have no formal public responsibility. This set­
up invites behind-the-scenes manipulation by Presidential 
advisers of the moment, possessed, it may be, both by a 
passion for anonymity and a passion for controlling 
national economic policy. However able and highminded 
these advisers may be, the arrangement is bad. 8
Henry Wallace, Roosevelt*s Vice President, also recommended a
council of professional economists, pointing out that a council
of this kind might have been helpful during the recession of 
49
1937 .
President Roosevelt and his economic policy advisers,
therefore, had a double influence upon the establishment of the
Council of Economic Advisers. By institutionalizing Presidential
leadership in the area of economic policy, Congress recognized
Roosevelt’s personal leadership in formulating and implementing
economic policy; however, Congress also recognized that some of
the economic advice received by Roosevelt was given to him by
people who were trained in economics but who were not necessarily
experts in the field, and who were unrestricted in their advisory
powers. The establishment of the Council of Economic Advisers was
an effort to facilitate Presidential leadership and at the same
50time control Presidential power.
48Ibid., p. 612. 
49Ibid., p. 849. 
^Seligman, p. 420.
CHAPTER VI
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Although efforts to form some type of permanent consulta­
tive body dealing with national security and war preparedness date
1
back to before World War I, the concept was not accepted until 
2
the 1940*s. With the advent of World War II and the subsequent 
abandonment of isolationism, the neeci for a security policy­
making body to coordinate military and political activities was 
realized. This need was satisfied when, as part of the National 
Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council was estab­
lished •
Since its beginning the National Security Council has
become an important part of the Presidential Advisory System,
3
moving into the Executive Office of the President in 1949. Mem­
bership of the Council includes the President, Vice President,
•*-Paul Yo Hammond, "The National Security Council as a 
Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation and 
Appraisal," American Political Science Review, LIV (December, 1960), 
p. 899.
2
Ernest R. May, "The Development of Political-Military Con­
sultation in the United States," Political Science Quarterly, LXX 
(June, 1955), p. 162.
q
See the message to the Congress transmitting Reorganization 
Plan 4 of 1949. U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1945-), Harry S. Truman, 1949, pp. 316-17.
80
81
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the Office 
of Emergency Planning, and others the President might appoint. 
Meetings are also attended by the Director of the Office of Man­
agement and Budget, Secretary of the Treasury, Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
4Staff. According to the National Security Act, the purpose of 
the Council is
. . .  to advise the President, with respect to the inte­
gration of domestic, foreign, and military policies 
relating to the national security so as to enable the 
military services and the other departments and agencies 
of the Government to cooperate more effectively in 
matters involving the national security.5
Ihe National Security Council has experienced a varying 
degree of influence during its relatively short history. As it is 
with any advisory unit within the Executive Office, success depends 
a great deal upon the use a President makes of it. During Presi­
dent Truman’s administration the Council went through a period of 
establishing itself as a working part of the Executive Office. 
Truman had a strong concern for the authority, responsibility, and 
prerogatives of the President and, therefore, treated the Council 
casually, emphasizing its strictly advisory role by not attending 
meetings regularly. He believed that the Council was to work out 
recommendations, but not make decisions or policy.
^James W. Davis, Jr., The National Executive Branch, An 
Introduction (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 26.
-*The National Security Act, Statutes at Large, LXI, sec.
101 (a), 495 (1947), U.S. Code, Vol. XI, sec. 402 (a) (1970).
^Falk, Stanley L., ’’The National Security Council Under 
Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy,’’ Political Science Quarterly,
LXXIX (September 1964), pp. 405-7.
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President Eisenhower preferred to institutionalize Presi-
. . .  . 7dential relationships in the Executive. Under Eisenhower the
Council became the central vehicle for formulating and promul­
gating policy, and Truman’s loose structure became an elaborate
g
system. Eisenhower met with the Council two or three times a 
g
month# Order was brought to the Council’s activities; however, 
it was criticized for being overstaffed, excessively rigid, and 
unable to deal with major aspects of national security policy 
When John Kennedy became President in 1961 he did away
i-
with the elaborate system Eisenhower had established, preferring
to deal with a single, small, strongly organized personal staff.
The working staff of the Council was emphasized and the Council
11
itself deemphasized. The superdepartment that existed under
Eisenhower became just another source of advice along with the
12other advisory bodies of the Executive. Kennedy preferred to 
work similarly to Truman, with problems brought to him for deci­
sion, as opposed to Eisenhower’s system of having decisions
^Louis W. Koenig, The Chief Executive (Harcourt, Brace and 
World, 1968), p. 167.
®Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere, eds., The President 
and the Management of National Security, A Report by the Institute 
for Defense Analyses (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 60.
^Koenig, p. 169.
10Falk, p. 424.
1:LClark and Legere, p. 70.
12Falk, pp. 429-430.
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13
brought to him for approval. President Johnson combined the two
methods of personal influence and institutionalization when working
with the National Security Council. He adopted the Roosevelt method
of assigning the same tasks to more than one person, but he also f
gave new recognition to his departmental Secretaries in the field
of national security. Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of
14
Defense McNamara were very influential.
Franklin Roosevelt’s influence on the establishment of a 
permanent national security council is not as pronounced as his 
influence on the establishment of Executive Office agencies pre­
viously discussed; however, Roosevelt was an early advocate for 
the establishment of some kind of consultative body of this type, 
and his efforts in this direction helped point out the need for 
such a body. His interest in the establishment of a council began 
when he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Woodrow Wilson. 
Before the start of World War I, he was one of the first to urge 
President Wilson to create a Council of National Defense to coor­
dinate the war preparedness effort, a suggestion Wilson delayed 
acting upon. In 1916, Wilson finally asked for and was granted
authorization by Congress to establish a Council of National Defense,
15
headed by the Secretary of War .
^Koenig, p. 172.
14Ibid., p. 176.
■^A.J. Wann, The President As Chief Admi ni str at or, A Study 
of Franklin D . Roosevelt (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 
1968), p. 13.
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During World War I, there was increased collaboration 
between the State Department and the military concerning national 
security matters, but once the war was over these efforts ceased, 
as did the functions of the Council of National Defense» In an 
effort to establish a permanent council, Roosevelt submitted a pro­
posal for a consultative organization comprised of members of the 
War, Navy, and State Departments, On May 1, 1919, a letter was
written to the Secretary of State suggesting that the Navy, War,
16and State Departments should form a Joint Plan Making Body, 
Accompanying the letter was an elaborate diagram that ", , . 
outlined duties for a State Department planning agency, for the 
Army General Staff, for a Naval General Staff, and for a Joint
17Plan Making Body, composed of officers from all three staffs,"
3>he Joint Body was to estimate national resources of both the 
United States and foreign countries, and define American objec­
tives for each possible war and determine the force needed for 
success. Roosevelt’s proposal never reached the Secretary of 
State, being sent by mistake to the State Department’s Division of 
Latin American Affairs where it was filed away until transferred 
to the general records.
A second proposal was submitted to the Secretary of State 
two years later. This time the proposal was made by the Army and
l-^Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Ordeal 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954), pp. 19-20.
■^May, p, 168.
18Ibid.
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the Navy, and called for State Department representation on the
Joint Board of the Army and Navy. The Secretary of State, Charles
Evans Hughes, dismissed the idea claiming that the only State
Department officials qualified to take part, the Secretary and the
Undersecretary, were too busy. Consequently, the military and the
19State Department went separate ways.
The military and the State Department did not get together 
formally to discuss national security until Roosevelt became Presi­
dent. His Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, began sending State 
Department officials to military conferences and including the 
military in some of the State Department activities. Alarmed by a 
possible war in Europe he proposed the formation of an interdepart­
mental committee to consider national security policy. The result 
was the establishment of the Standing Liaison Committee, composed 
of the Undersecretary of State, the Chief of Naval Operations, and 
the Army Chief of Staff. The Standing Liaison Committee became the 
first regular council on national security policy incorporating the 
military and the State Department. Existing until 1943, the Stand­
ing Liaison Committee was not extremely effective, rarely deciding 
on issues of policy. However, it did give the military and the
State Department an opportunity to work together and gain insights
20into each otherrs official activities.
19Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National 
Security (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 30.
20May, p. 172.
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At the approach of World War II, an ad hoc Cabinet committee
was organized by Roosevelt consisting of the Secretaries of War,
Navy, and State. This informal war council had no secretariat,
21agenda, or machinery for lower level coordination. It met on
the call of the President, and met very frequently before the start
22
of World War II. Despite its resemblance to the present National 
Security Council, Roosevelt did not give the War Council an oppor­
tunity to formulate policy on its own, running it in the same 
manner as he ran other special councils he formed, as a platform 
to announce decisions already made and to outline his own ideas on 
the subject of security policy. When war broke out, Roosevelt 
dropped Secretary Hull and the State Department out of the War 
Council and dealt with his chiefs of staff and his personal
advisers. Coordination of strategy and policy was temporarily for- 
23gotten. According to Henry Stimson, RooseveltTs Secretary of 
War, establishing a war council as an effective security policy­
making body was prevented by Rooseveltfs desire to make policy
decisions himself. The lack of authority to act on its own under-
24mined the effectiveness of any war council formed.
^Stanley, p. 9.
22U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of 
the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, before the Army Pearl Harbor 
Board, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1946, p. 2066.
23May, p. 173.
24
Henry L. Stimson and MeGeorge Bundy, On Active Service 
In Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 562-564.
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In 1940, as the result of an exchange of letters between
the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, another war council
was formed. Regular, unofficial and personal meetings were held,
serving the purpose of keeping one another informed on major
25problems concerning politico-military matters. In 1944, this
Committee of three was reorganized with the establishment uf a
recorder, a formal agenda, and the reaching of conclusions. An
interdepartmental body was formed at the assistant secretary level
composed of representatives from the State, War, and Navy Depart- 
26ments. An example of the Committee^ activity is its participa­
tion in the drafting of the occupation directives for Germany,
27Austria, and Japan.
The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), as this 
new body was called, operated through subcommittees composed of 
departmental representatives which were coordinated by a secre­
tariat. Policy proposals were cleaxed by the secretariat before
they were sent to the Assistant Secretaries. Any disagreement with
28decisions made by the Committee was referred to the President.
The Committee became the State, Army, Navy, and Air Force Coor­
dinating Committee (SANACC) when the Air Force gained departmental
23Harold W. Mosely, Chairles W. McCarthy, and Alvin F. 
Richardson, ’’The St ate-War-Navy Coordinating Committee,” The Depart­
ment of St at e Bulletin, XIII (November 11, 1945), p. 745.
2^Stimson and Bundy, p. 563.
27Mosely, McCarthy, and Richardson, p. 746.
28Ibid., pp. 746-747.
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status in 1947, and existed alongside the National Security Coun-
29
cil until abolished in 1949.
A further step toward the eventual establishment of a
National Security Council was taken by President Truman on January
22, 1946, when he named the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy to
a National Intelligence Authority for the purpose of planning,
developing, and coordinating all federal foreign intelligence
activities. He also established a central intelligence group,
headed by a Director of Central Intelligence to assist the National
Intelligence Authority. In 1947, the National Intelligence
30Authority was replaced by the National Security Council.
Towards the end of the War, efforts began to bring about 
the unification of the Armed Forces. Several proposals were 
advanced concerning the relationship of the services, the most 
significant in relation to politico-military coordination being 
the Eberstadt Report. The Eberstadt Report was a report by Fer­
dinand Eberstadt prepared for Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal 
and presented to the Senate Committee on the Armed Services. In
the report Eberstadt made suggestions that were Incorporated into
31the National Security Act of 1947. He suggested the following:
^Edward H. Hobbs, Behind the President, A Study of Execu­
tive Office Agencies (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954), 
p. 127.
30Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and 
Hope (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956), pp. 56-58.
31Hobbs, p. 128.
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A National Security Council • . • established to 
link up military and foreign policy. It would be composed 
of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Air, the 
chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the 
joint chiefs of staff. The President would be the chair­
man, and in his absence the Vice President or the Secretary 
of State. The council would have a permanent secretariat.
It would have policy-forming and advisory functions and 
would, among other things, advise on the combined military 
budget. The Central Intelligence Agency would be a part of
it .32
Franklin Roosevelt’s influence upon the establishment of 
the National Security Council was both positive and negative. He 
recognized even before the start of World War I that there was a 
need for a body designed to coordinate national security policy. 
His efforts and the efforts of members of his administration to 
form such a body set precedents for political and military cooper­
ation in determining national security policy. However, the 
organizations formed were hindered by Roosevelt’s unwillingness to 
delegate authority. The committees formed during Roosevelt’s 
administration and immediately after
. . . suffered for lack of a definite mission, statutory 
foundation, permanent staff, and, most of all, authori­
tative direction. The lessons learned through their 
experiments were all applied to the establishment of the 
National Security C o u n c i l .
Of the Presidents who succeeded Roosevelt as chief execu­
tive, Kennedy and Johnson came closest to handling the National 
Security Council in the manner Roosevelt handled his national
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 
National Defense Establishment, Hearings, Senate, on S, 758, 80th 
Cong., 1st sess,, 1947, p. 8 .
^Sidney W. Souers, Address to the Joint Civilian Orienta­
tion Conference on June 14, 1949, quoted in Hobbs, p. 127.
security advisory. They liked to make the final decision on 
security matters, and relied on a small, more personal, staff to 
advise them on national security matters. The big difference 
between Roosevelt’s attempts at establishing some type of national 
security advisory and the use made of the National Security Council 
by Kennedy and Johnson is that the National Security Council has a 
statutory foundation. Also, it was permanently established as part 
of the Executive by President Eisenhower. Presidents may make 
extensive use, or only casual use of the Council, but it has become 
a permanent part of the Executive Office of the President. Thanks 
to precedents set by Roosevelt, and the work accomplished by his 
successors, the Council is there for Presidents to use according 
to their administrative styles.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Franklin Roosevelt’s influence on the admi nistrativR 
organization of the national government is considerable. Under 
Roosevelt, both the range of activities of the national government 
and the size of its administrative organization were expanded. It 
was Roosevelt who, by his actions and by the creation of the Execu­
tive Office of the President, established the President as the 
chief administrator of the entire executive organization.
Before 1939, the President’s ’’Inner Circle” and personnel
borrowed from executive agencies primarily acted as Roosevelt’s
administrative staff, handling legislative matters, propaganda,
2election campaigns, and other administrative duties. The estab­
lishment of the Executive Office institutionalized this make-shift 
administrative staff. He created the Executive Office to provide 
a means for keeping the President informed on important matters, 
to assist him in planning future programs, to protect him from 
wasting his time and energies on subordinate affairs, to get 
priority matters to his desk promptly, and to see that directives
"^ A. J. Wann, The President As Chi ef Administrator, A Study 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 
1968), pp. 169-176.
oJames MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 266.
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3
are carried out by subordinates c
The Executive Office of the President has become such an 
important part of the Executive Branch it would be impossible for 
the Presidency to operate without it today. Roosevelt needed it 
to help him administer a national government that had expanded to 
where it was impossible for one man to control. Today, the Presi­
dent has to administer a national government that has expanded far 
beyond what Roosevelt had to contend with.
The composition of the Executive Office has changed since 
Roosevelt established it, with some agencies being added and some 
eliminated. The White House Office and the Bureau of the Budget, 
now called the Office of Management and Budget, are the only two 
agencies from the 1939 Executive Office still functioning, but more 
than twice as many agencies presently exist in the Executive Office 
than existed there in 1939, an indication of the growth of the 
Federal Government.
A unique quality of the Presidential Advisory System form­
alized by Roosevelt, has been its flexibility. Institutionaliza­
tion did not mean rigidity. Presidents have been able to adapt it 
to their own personal style of administration. For example, 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson relied on the less formal aspects 
of the system for advice, usually meeting to work out problems with 
a small personal staff made up of members of the various advisory
^Edward H. Hobbs, Behind The President, A Study of Execu­
tive Office Agencies (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954), 
pp. 6-7.
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agencies, relying on the more formal aspects of the system only 
when necessary. In contrast, President EisenhowerS method of 
administering his office was to rely primarily on the more formal 
aspects of the system, with routine meetings of committees and 
councils.
t t
As it has been since the beginning of the Presidency, 
force of personality has made some advisers favorites, and these 
advisers have influenced the thinking of the President and the 
direction of the Administration, Henry Kissinger being a case in 
point. Also, since its creation, there has been a tendency for 
Presidents to favor certain executive agencies over others, 
depending on what kind of personality he possesses and where his 
interests lie. Both the White House Office and the Bureau of the 
Budget have enjoyed a favored position and have experienced a 
steady growth in size and influence since 1939.
The White House Office has expanded in size and influence 
to rival the Cabinet. This expansion of size and influence may 
have reached its zenith with the revelation of its involvement in 
the Watergate Affair. The White House Office is now being sub­
jected to a great deal of criticism. James L. Sundquist, a senior 
fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of Dynamics of the 
Party System, in calling for the establishment of a parliamentary 
type of system, decried the lack of control of the White House 
Office.
Replacing the cabinet as the presidents consulta­
tive group has been a presidential-level staff, which 
has no outside power bases and hence no independence, 
and which is not subj'ect to Senate confirmation. This
staff now formulates policy for the president, issues 
orders on his behalf and supervises and coordinates 
their execution
Another post-Watergate critic, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 
calls for the reduction in size and power of the White House staff 
and a restoration of the executive departments. "The President 
will always need a small and alert, personal staff to serve as his 
eyes and ears and one lobe of his brain, but he must avoid a vast 
and possessive staff ambitious to make all the decisions of govern 
raent.
The Senate Watergate Committee, commissioned by the Senate 
to investigate illegal campaign practices in the 1972 Presidential 
Election and to make recommendations which would prevent such 
practices in the future, has recommended in a preliminary report 
that anumber of top White House posts be subject to Senate con­
firmation, particularly that of Chief of the Domestic Council. 
Other preliminary proposals made by the Committee call for pro­
hibiting assistants to the President from being interposed 
between the President and heads of departments in the exercise of 
their statutory or delegated functions, and limiting the top White 
House staff to as few as 15 aides with no more than 50 supporting 
professional employees. This last recommendation gives one an
^James L. Sundquist, ’’How to Limit The Power of The Presi­
dency,” The Denver Post, November 11, 1973, p. 37.
^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 
(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1973), p. 408.
^Clay F. Richards, ’’Plan to Cut Presidential Power Expected,
The Denver Post, April 26, 1974, p. 8 .
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idea of how the White House Office has grown since its estab­
lishment when Roosevelt had to fight to get six administrative 
as sistant s .
Clark Clifford and Benjamin Cohen, both former members of
the Presidential "Inner Circle," have also criticized the growing
size and power of the White House advisers. Clifford has expressed
the opinion that this growth is a dangerous trend resulting in the
breakdown in the morale of personnel throughout the executive 
7
branch. Cohen recommends that a small inner or super Cabinet be
formed to share with the President his gravest responsibilities»
These surrogates, as Cohen calls them, would be persons of high
and independent public standing and would have to be confirmed by 
8the Senate.
The size and influence of the White House Office, combined 
with President NixonTs tendency to isolate the Oval Office from 
the routine business of his staff, has resulted in the White House 
Office getting out of control. It is a prime example of how a 
Presidents personality can affect the Executive Branch.
The Bureau of the Budget has also had a steady expansion 
of its size and influence since its inclusion in the original 
Executive Office. It has bee one the Presidents administrative 
right arm and has been given an increasing number of management 
responsibilities. "The Bureau in many areas, e.g., establishing
7
Hughes, Emmet John, The Living Presidency (New York: 
Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, Inc., 1973), p. 318.
8Ibid ., p. 323.
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budget ceilings for the departments and clearing proposed legis­
lation and enrolled bills with interested parties has become an
g
extension of the President’s ego.” However, despite its 
increased influence the Bureau of the Budget has been able to 
stay clear of extreme controversy. This could be due to the fact 
that the people in the bureau are professionals, and for the most 
part are non-partisan.
In contrast to the previously discussed members of the 
Executive Office, the Council of Economic Advisers and the National 
Security Council have had ups and downs in their influence. They 
have had to compete with the members of the President’s White 
House Staff for the President’s ear. Some Presidents have placed 
more emphasis on their advice than have others. For example, 
President Eisenhower made extensive use of the Security Council, 
whereas, President Kennedy practically ignored the Council. 
President Nixon seems to be making greater use of the Council of 
Economic Advisers than previous Presidents. It may be that Presi­
dents feel more comfortable dealing with their personal staffs than 
dealing with a formal council. The important thing is that the 
expert advice of these two agencies is available when needed.
Roosevelt supplied the framework for the Presidential 
Advisory System. He gave himself and his successors the tools to 
help cope with expanding government. A serious problem faced by 
Presidents today may be the expansion of the advisory system
^Hobbs, p. 40.
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itself. The Executive Office now has fourteen agencies included 
in it with hundreds of people working in many of those agencies.
It may be necessary, as exemplified by the White House Office, to 
limit that expansion to prevent bureaucracy from hampering the work 
of the Executive. Problems of administration faced by Presidents 
in the future may be similar to those faced by Roosevelt.
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